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ABSTRACT 
The following article seeks to apply the retrenchment in constitutional Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence of the last few decades to the phenomenon of trademark propertization, the expansive 
and largely federal movement towards protecting trademarks as assets apart from any connection 
to referent goods and services.  Trademark scholars have filled the trademarks literature with 
critiques of propertization that generally object, on policy and historical grounds, to the trend and 
offer constructions of the Lanham Act designed to check its progress.  With the notable exception of 
an article published in 2000 by Professor Kenneth Port, however, the literature has largely avoided 
addressing the question of whether the United States Congress possesses the authority to push 
trademark law so far in that direction. 
Building off of Barton Beebe’s semiotic account of trademark law, the article observes that much of 
the Commerce Clause case law in the trademark space is muddied by the failure to draw an 
analytic distinction between the trademark as such (i.e., the trademark’s signifier) and the goods 
and services with which it is used.  Moreover, many of the seminal cases in the area predate such 
important new contributions to Commerce Clause jurisprudence as United States v. Lopez, 
Gonzalez v. Raich, and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius. 
Upon close review of these and other recent precedents, and a thorough application of 
contemporary, three-category Commerce Clause analysis to trademark propertization, the article 
concludes that there is a firm constitutional limit to Congresses’ ability to regulate trademark 
signifiers detached from goods and services.  Namely, Congress may not recognize or protect a 
property interest in trademarks as such except as a rational means of furthering the regulation of 
referent goods or services.  Although distant and unreachable in most cases, this constitutional 
ceiling serves as a critical constructional limit on certain controversial trademark doctrines like 
dilution and the rule against assignments in gross, and prevents the U.S. Congress from ever 
recognizing pure trademarks in the abstract as property upon creation.   Although a complete 
defense of trademark “localism” is outside of the article’s scope, it ends by offering some basic policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades now, intellectual property scholars have engaged in a 
critique of the so-called “propertization” of trademarks in the United 
States.  Although the exact contours of propertization are vague, the 
term loosely refers to a shift toward protecting trademarks “as things 
valuable in and of themselves,”1 or in semiotic terms, protecting a 
trademark’s signifier (i.e., the mark itself), disconnected from any 
referent goods or services.  These propertization critiques generally 
object, on policy and historical grounds, to the phenomenon and of-
fer constructions of the Lanham Act designed to check its progress.  
One leading propertization scholar, Kenneth Port, further raises the 
possibility that some of these changes “rest on questionable constitu-
tional grounds.”2 
The following Article seeks to explore in depth, and in light of 
new Supreme Court precedents, the fundamental question first 
raised by Professor Port:  namely, does the federal government have 
the constitutional authority to propertize trademark law?  Can Con-
gress, to put the matter in the extreme, pass a statute simply recogniz-
ing that one who creates a trademark is its owner?3 
Putting aside the normative question of whether the federal gov-
ernment should be allowed this authority, it finds that posing the 
basic descriptive question is more complex, and the analytic frame-
work harder to apply, than generally assumed.  Accounts that cite to 
Congress’s authority, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate goods 
and services that flow in, or affect, interstate commerce generally fail 
to acknowledge the conceptually distinct question of Congress’s right 
to regulate trademark signifiers divorced from those goods and ser-
vices.  This failure is particularly notable in light of the propertization 
critique’s central premise that trademark law has steadily been divorc-
ing trademark signifiers from their referent goods and services.  Oth-
er accounts, such as Professor Port’s, observe the distinction but fail 
to account for the full breadth of Congress’s authority to protect 
trademark signifiers, standing alone, by virtue of having once been 
connected to goods and services in commerce, or as part of a rational 
overall scheme for the regulation of such goods and services. 
 
 1 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 
1688 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Death of Common Sense]. 
 2 Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law:  A Civil Law Sys-
tem in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV 827, 829 (2000) [hereinafter Port, Congressional 
Expansion]. 
 3 This hypothetical is based on that put forward by Stephen L. Carter in his article, Does it 
Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 720–21 (1993). 
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The Article begins in Part I by providing an overview of trademark 
propertization, and a hypothetical designed to test the limits of Con-
gress’s ability to adopt a purely propertized trademark regime in the 
United States.  Relying heavily on Barton Beebe’s semiotic analysis of 
trademark law, it then offers in Part II a short section summarizing 
the structure of trademarks particularly as related to trademark 
propertization. 
It then moves in Part III to the Commerce Clause, and shows how 
Congress’s authority to regulate the goods and services with which 
trademarks are used is immensely broad.  Whether analyzed under 
the first, second, or third category of contemporary, formal Com-
merce Clause analysis, or some combination of the three, Congress 
has ample authority to regulate these trademark referents.  For this 
reason, Congress’s power over the regulation of trademarks used or 
intended to be used in connection with goods and services is, and 
should be, virtually limitless. 
The Article then shows in Part IV that the foregoing analysis is 
fundamentally inapposite as applied to trademark propertization.  It 
offers, in this connection, an analogy to food and drug regulation, 
designed to show that Congress’s right to regulate labels used with 
foods and drugs is not coextensive with its right to regulate labels 
more generally.  Trademark propertization, akin to regulation of la-
bels in general, requires a separate and distinct Commerce Clause 
analysis from that used to justify regulation of trademarks affixed to 
goods and services. 
Accordingly, the Article then moves in Part V to a pure applica-
tion of Commerce Clause analysis to trademark signifiers as such.  It 
finds, contrary to prior scholars, that the strongest support for such 
regulation may be found in the first and second categories of Com-
merce Clause analysis under a “state-border crossing” theory analo-
gous to Congress’s right to apply federal law to firearms that previous-
ly moved in commerce even if no longer possessed by the original 
transporter.  This regulatory power, however, remains limited by 
some original nexus to that earlier border crossing by a good or ser-
vice.  A similar result follows from category three analysis under cases 
such as Gonzales v. Raich4 and National Federation of Independent Business 
 
 4 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that the Controlled Substances Act was a valid exercise of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause because the authority to regulate inter-
state markets for medicinal substances includes parts of those markets “supplied with 
drugs produced and consumed locally”). 
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v. Sebelius.5  Namely, Congress’s power to regulate trademark signifi-
ers, as part of a rational plan to regulate goods and service in or af-
fecting commerce, is broad.  It is not, however, unlimited.  In particu-
lar, there must always be some reasonably articulable tie back to the 
regulation of actual goods and services.  In no event, however, may 
Congress simply recognize standalone property rights in a trademark 
as such. 
At the conclusion of this Part, the Article then reviews, in the ab-
sence of Commerce Clause authority, what other sources of constitu-
tional authority Congress might rely on to regulate all aspects of the 
trademark relationship.  It finds that none of these sources provides 
Congress with authority to recognize trademark signifiers as a pure 
property right. 
In Part VI, the Article concludes that there is a firm constitutional 
limit to Congress’s ability to regulate trademark signifiers detached 
from goods and services.  Namely, Congress may not recognize or 
protect a property interest in trademark signifiers except as a rational 
means of furthering the regulation of referent goods or services.  Alt-
hough distant and unreachable in most cases, this constitutional ceil-
ing nevertheless serves as a critical constructional limit on certain 
controversial trademark doctrines like dilution and the rule against 
assignments in gross, and prevents Congress from ever simply grant-
ing trademark rights to the creator of a new trademark as such.  Alt-
hough a defense of trademark “localism” is expressly outside of the 
Article’s scope, it ends by offering some basic policy and structural 
justifications for accepting this limit on federal authority in the 
trademark sphere, and to lay the groundwork for future normative 
inquiry. 
I. THE LIMITS OF TRADEMARK PROPERTIZATION 
The central subject of this Article, trademark propertization, has 
meant different things to different people.  The legal realist Felix 
Cohen was one of the earliest adopters of the notion, using the 
phrase “thingification of property” to describe a means by which 
courts veil value judgments in trademark cases though conclusory 
application of the term “property” to trademark uses they wish to 
 
 5 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care 
Act could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because it compelled, rather 
than regulated, commercial activity). 
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protect.6  As such Cohen approached trademark propertization as the 
transformation of something inherently valueless, namely an abstract 
word or symbol, into something valuable through the setting of a le-
gal entitlement, namely the grant of an exclusive right to use it. 
In more current usage, the term tends to refer to the contempo-
rary push to protect trademark rights, akin to patents and copyrights, 
as “intellectual products of the mind.”7  Under this conception, “A’s 
ownership rights in a mark come because she has thought it up and 
not because she has used it to distinguish her goods in com-
merce . . . .”8 For instance, we might see the adoption of the intent-to-
use trademark regime in the late 1980s as emblematic of a move to-
wards trademark propertization because it grants creators of trade-
marks the power to reserve rights in marks they have thought up but 
not yet used with any goods.9 
A close corollary usage considers trademark propertization as the 
attempt to protect trademarks apart from underlying goodwill, or in 
gross.10  Mark Lemley explains this phenomenon as “an increasing 
tendency to treat trademarks as assets with their own intrinsic value, 
rather than as a means to an end.”11  Kenneth Port suggests that it is a 
move towards a civil law based system, “where the trademark itself is 
considered subject to property ownership,” and away from the com-
mon law origins of the U.S. system.12 
In a broader sense, some have used propertization to refer to a 
more general “shift in trademark law away from confusion-based pro-
tection and towards a property-based regime that is focused only su-
perficially on consumers.”13  Under this conception, a range of doc-
trinal developments arguably rooted in brand-value retention rather 
 
 6 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 815–816 (1935) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Carter, supra note 3, at 720. 
 8 Id. at 720–21. 
 9 Id. at 721. 
 10 See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 553 
(1993) [hereinafter Port, Illegitimacy] (distinguishing between the rights granted to pa-
tent and copyright owners, which resemble classical property rights, and those given to 
trademark holders).  Relying on A.M. Honore’s list of the incidents of ownership, Port 
concludes that trademarks, traditionally understood, lack many of the key rights we asso-
ciate with property.  Id. at 554–55.  For example, one of those incidents, the right to pos-
sess, is defined by Honore as the right to exclusive control over the thing in question.  Id.  
Trademark holders, however, do not enjoy exclusive authority over the trademark, for 
other entities may use the mark under the doctrine of “fair use.”  Id. at 555. 
 11 Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 1, at 1693. 
 12 Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 829. 
 13 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839, 1847 (2007). 
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than consumer protection and information-transmission norms (e.g., 
dilution and trade dress protections) are consistent with increased 
trademark propertization.14 
This Article will use the term trademark propertization in a closely 
related but slightly more focused manner to refer to the grant of 
some degree of legal protection to a trademark’s signifier discon-
nected from any referent goods or services.  This definition is meant 
to track Barton Beebe’s semiotic explanation, discussed below, that 
“to expand the scope of their property rights, trademark owners have 
sought to define their property rights as an exclusive right to the sig-
nifier in itself.”15 
This Article does not address the substance of the propertization 
claim (i.e., whether trademark rights are becoming more 
propertized, and if so whether that is a good or bad thing).  Rather, it 
focuses on whether, and to what degree, Congress and federal courts 
interpreting federal law have the authority to protect trademark sig-
nifiers as a pure form of property. 
For instance, it is conceivable that Congress might seek to push 
federal trademark law to its constitutional extreme.  As Professor 
Carter intimated, it might wish to amend the Lanham Act to recog-
nize trademark rights as commencing not with use of (or intention to 
use) a trademark with goods and services, but rather with simple au-
thorship of a trademark, in the sense used in the Copyright Act.16 
“Trademark protection,” the amended statute might run, “subsists 
in trademarks fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”  Continu-
ing the parallel to copyright law, the statute might continue, “Trade-
marks protected under this title vest initially in the author or authors 
of the marks.”  Under this new regime, one could conceive of an en-
tire industry of brand creation companies developing and then sell-
ing rights to authored trademarks.  Could the U.S. Congress so baldly 
set such a radical shift in U.S. trademark law? 17 
 
 14 Id.  See also Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 1, at 1699–1700. 
 15 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 651 (2004). 
The definition used in this Article intentionally excludes increased trade dress protec-
tions from its scope.  The increase of trade dress protection is attributable to the merger 
of the signifier with the referent, as opposed to elimination of the referent from the 
trademark structure.  Accordingly, it is a categorically different type of claim that is not 
within the scope of this Article. 
 16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copy-
right in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work.”). 
 17 It may be tempting to respond to this extreme case with a simple citation to the Trade-
Mark Cases, the 135-year-old and still leading precedent in trademark Commerce Clause 
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II. TRADEMARK PROPERTIZATION AND SEMIOTICS 
Before turning to the Commerce Clause and testing this hypothet-
ical statute, it is helpful to first place the above definition of trade-
mark propertization in its native semiotic context.  As Barton Beebe 
lays out in his leading article on the subject, trademarks may be un-
derstood semiotically as triadic structures consisting of three neces-
sarily separate but linked aspects:  (1) the trademark’s signifier (the 
tangible symbol, i.e., word, name, symbol, device, etc.); (2) the 
trademark’s referent (the actual goods or services to which the signi-
fier refers); and (3) the trademark’s signified (the source’s good-
will).18  Beebe gives the example of the trademark NIKE which con-
sists of the signifier (“the word ‘nike’”), the signified (“the goodwill 
of Nike, Inc.”), and the referent (“the shoes or other athletic gear to 
which the ‘nike’ signifier is attached”).19 
Trademark propertization, insofar as it makes the signifier itself its 
own product or referent, thus entails a radical semiotic restructuring.  
It “collapses the trademark’s conventional triadic structure by forcing 
a merger of signified and referent.”20  Rather than NIKE being pro-
tected in relation to its connection to shoes, the term NIKE (and the 
signified goodwill it represents) is now itself the thing being protect-
ed for its own sake.  Shoes lose their relevance.  Propertization is thus 
the story of “the rise of the dyadic mark, unaffixed to any particular 
 
jurisprudence.  100 U.S. 82 (1879).  As discussed in the body of this piece below, that case 
makes clear that Congress’s authority to regulate trademarks only extends as far as the 
reach of the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 96.  For this reason, the case invalidated the first 
general federal trademark act, the Trademark Act of 1870, due to Congress’s failure to 
stay within those bounds.  Id. at 97.  Even, however, if one were to close an eye to the fact 
that Commerce Clause jurisprudence has expanded radically since the case was decided 
in 1879, the Trade-Mark Cases holding is deceptively inapposite to this hypothetical.  The 
original statute held unconstitutional in that case required use of, or intention to use, the 
subject trademark in connection with goods.  Id.  For instance, under the 1879 Act, the 
applicant was “required to furnish a statement of the class of merchandise, and the par-
ticular description of the goods comprised in such class, by which the trade-mark has 
been or is intended to be appropriated.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
constitutional infirmity, according to the Court, lay in the statute’s failure to require that 
those goods be transported from one state to another.  Id.  In other words, the Court de-
termined that if a U.S. trademark regime is to be constructed around use of trademarks 
in connection with goods, then those goods must be goods in interstate commerce.  Id.  It 
is an oft-repeated mistake to read the case, standing alone, as setting a constitutional re-
quirement that trademarks must be used in connection with goods in commerce.  It liter-
ally says nothing about a federal trademark statute based on creation of trademark signi-
fiers as such.  While it might have some persuasive application to such a propertized 
trademark regime, the precedent is at best tangential and certainly non-binding. 
 18  Beebe, supra note15, at 646. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 658. 
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product, referring to no product other than its own distinctiveness.”21  
The key insight of the propertization critique for purposes of this Ar-
ticle may thus be summed up as the untethering of the associational 
link between trademarks and the goods and services with which they 
are used. 
Trademark propertization can apply, under this formulation, to 
two different but related types of control of the trademark’s signifier.  
First, there is the vertical relationship between a trademark’s signifier 
and the signified, known as signification.22  This is, in essence, the 
“positive meaning” we ascribe to a term or logo.23  Second, there is 
the horizontal relationship between the signifier and other trade-
marks, known as value.24  This is the negative difference or distinc-
tiveness of a term or logo from other terms or logos.25  Beebe goes in-
to some depth on the interrelated nature of signification and value,26 
however for these purposes it is enough to say that trademark 
propertization is not exclusively tied to signification or value.  What is 
key is that whether we are talking about control over a signifier’s 
meaning or its distinctiveness or both, when we are talking about 
trademark propertization we are leaving out the good or service ref-
erent. 
Dilution doctrine is a classic instance of trademark propertization 
under this definition.27  This is because of dilution’s laser focus on the 
mark as a mark.  As defined in the current Lanham Act, dilution by 
blurring is “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
 
 21 Id. at 683. 
 22 Id. at 639. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Beebe, supra note 15, at 639. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 640–41. 
 27 Most scholars or commentators writing on the issue of trademark propertization have 
targeted dilution as a key battleground.  See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 493–95 (2005) 
(considering the interrelationship between dilution doctrine and a merchandising right); 
Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 1, at 1699 (identifying ways that dilution doc-
trine has expanded trademark rights); McKenna, supra note 13, at 1912 (“The concept of 
trademark dilution generally is considered a radical departure from traditional trade-
mark principles.”); Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 829 (considering dilu-
tion an area of major recent development in trademark law with the passage of the Fed-
eral Dilution statute in 1996); Port, Illegitimacy, supra note 10, at 558 (“Not to place [anti-
dilution law’s fame] restriction on trademark holders would come too close to recogniz-
ing a trademark itself as property.”); Michael Pulos, Comment, A Semiotic Solution to the 
Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833, 855–57 (2006) (arguing that 
“propertization” critiques of the dilution doctrine are misplaced). 
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famous mark.”28  This definition on its face says nothing about the 
goods or services with which the mark is used—or even for that mat-
ter about the mark’s connection with its source.  Rather it is concep-
tually centered around protection of the trademark signifier as such.  
As Beebe explains, dilution in its most radical incarnation protects 
“the mark as a unique identifier, regardless of its source or prod-
uct.”29 
A recent Louis Vuitton case, for instance, reveals dilution as a 
form of propertization.30  The famous brand-owner prevailed on 
summary judgment with respect to its federal dilution claim against 
the car-maker Hyundai, with respect to a Hyundai Super Bowl adver-
tisement for the latter’s Sonata car.31  The thirty-second ad featured, 
in passing, an “inner-city basketball game” scene in which the basket-
ball in play contained a design similar, but not identical, to Louis 
Vuitton’s famous “toile monogram” mark.32  As recounted by the 
court, Hyundai intentionally drew an association with the toile mon-
ogram for the 2011 Sonata ad in order to contrast a symbol of “old 
luxury” from Hyundai’s image in the context of a recession.33 
The claim at issue, being one for trademark dilution rather than 
infringement, involved no analysis of any goods or services.34  The key 
point, for the court, was simply that the use by Hyundai of the imita-
tive pattern on the basketball was intended to, and in fact did, create 
an “association” with the original toile mark.35  It was irrelevant to the 
 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).  A parallel definition is provided for dilution by 
tarnishment, which covers association that “harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 29 Beebe, supra note 15, at 688. 
 30 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id.  The “toile monogram” mark was described as “a repeating pattern design of the let-
ters ‘LV’ and flower-like symbols on a chestnut-brown background.”  Id.  The main 
change was that the ball contained the letters “LZ” rather than “LV”.  Id. 
 33 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  At deposition, Louis Vuitton showed that 
this association with Louis Vuitton was also made “to raise the image of the Hyundai 
brand in the mind of the consumer.”  Id. at *3. 
 34 To the contrary, the court made clear that the federal anti-dilution statute, under which 
the claim was brought, was targeted against use “in a non-confusing way in an unrelated 
area of commerce.”  Id. at *5 (quoting TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 
F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 35 Id. at *9–14 (recounting evidence of, inter alia, intentional and actual intermark associa-
tion, and concluding that Hyundai was liable for dilution by blurring as a matter of law).  
Although the test the court adopts clearly refers to association between the marks as 
marks, the court’s analysis conflates this with association between the parties.  Compare id. 
at *9–10 (stating that the court weighs associations between the marks in its analysis) with 
id. at *13 (“Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence that Hyundai utilized the Louis Vuitton 
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court that “the pattern was not used to designate Hyundai’s own 
goods, services, or business.”36  Speaking in heavily propertized terms, 
the gist of the offense was “laddering and borrowing equity from Lou-
is Vuitton.”37 
The dilution claim in this case is thus an exemplar of trademark 
propertization.  As understood by the court, the dilution provisions of 
the Lanham Act (“designed solely for the benefit of sellers”)38 purely 
protect “brand equity” from being taken by another.39  The signifier 
(and its signified goodwill) is all that matters.  Indeed, the contention 
by Hyundai that referent goods or services should factor-in at all was 
dismissed as “conflat[ing] dilution with a false designation of ori-
gins.”40  Thus, Louis Vuitton prevailed on its claim as a matter of law, 
positioning it to prevent its toile monogram mark from appearing, 
for a fleeting moment, on a basketball in a car ad. 
Although a model form of propertization, the dilution claim in 
the Louis Vuitton case is not propertization at its most extreme, but 
rather a middle ground on a propertizing continuum.  This is be-
cause the plaintiff’s toile monogram had for decades been used in 
connection with goods—namely luxury goods such as the high-end 
luggage famously sold under the mark.  It was only defendant’s use of 
the subject mark that was unaffixed to any trademark referents. 
At the most extreme end of the propertization continuum even a 
brand-owner’s initial acquisition of the mark might be protected, 
from infancy, apart from any relation to goods and services (such as 
in the hypothetical trademark statute offered above).41  This 
propertizes the entire regime—beginning with initial acquisition by 
the plaintiff. 
The remainder of this Article seeks to identify what constitutional 
limitations, if any, there might be to Congress’s ability to propertize 
trademarks, and to place that limit somewhere on the continuum 
shaped by the above examples. 
 
marks for its own branding goals, and, in the minds of some consumers, created actual 
association between Hyundai and Louis Vuitton.”). 
 36 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012) (internal punctuation omitted) (noting that 
such goods presumably included “a hypothetical product such as the Louis Vuitton Sona-
ta, or the actual sale of Louis Vuitton-style basketballs”) 
 37 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Id. at *5. 
 39 Id. at *13. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See supra Part I. 
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III. TRADEMARKS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In order to answer the foregoing question this Article now turns 
to the Commerce Clause in general, and applications of the Com-
merce Clause to trademark law in particular.  It finds that while con-
temporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence appropriately recognizes 
the vast breadth of Congress’s right to regulate trademarks, such cas-
es center their analyses around the good and service referents with 
which trademarks are used (and not the trademarks’ signifiers as 
such).  This greatly limits their value in answering constitutional 
questions about trademark propertization. 
A. Contemporary Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Gives Ample Room for 
Congress to Regulate the Goods and Services with Which Trademarks are 
Used 
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence generally identifies three 
categories of regulation under which Congress is authorized to “regu-
late Commerce . . . among the several States”.42  First, Congress can 
regulate the channels of interstate commerce, such as the nation’s 
highways, waterways, airways, and Internet.43  Second, Congress has 
authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce (such as planes, trains, automobiles, computers, and tele-
phones) and persons or things in interstate commerce.44  Third, 
Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.45 
Before turning to federal court and agency treatments of the 
Commerce Clause in actual trademark cases, it is helpful to first 
acknowledge the imperfect fit between this formal Lopez-style analysis 
and trademark cases.46  Congress’s power to regulate trademarks im-
plicates and cuts across all three categories, blurring the boundaries 
and complicating attempts at categorization.47 
 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 43 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005); BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE 
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.01[B][1] (2d ed. 2013) (citing 
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 44 Raich, 545 U.S. at 16–17; DENNING, supra note 43, § 5.01[B][2]. 
 45 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. 
 46 Although United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) is probably the leading case 
associated with three-category analysis, it was first introduced in Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146, 150 (1971).  See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 33–34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (identify-
ing Perez as the origin of three-category analysis in Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 47 Gordon G. Young contends that it is more helpful to divide Commerce Clause cases into 
two categories, with the understanding that they are not entirely distinct:  those involving 
regulations based on (1) “Congress’s power to control and facilitate reasonably identifia-
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Take, for instance, the typical case of the PEPSI trademark on a 
label on a bottle of Pepsi soda.  You could locate Congress’s authority 
to regulate that label under the first category, as the labeled bottles 
are distributed via highway, waterway and/or train track, and ordered 
over the Internet.  Under category one, Congress may deny “the facil-
ities of interstate commerce” to “adulterated” products (i.e., infring-
ing goods) in order to prohibit such products from being shipped 
from one state to another.48 
Alternatively, you could look to the Pepsi bottles, and the labels 
on them, as the actual “things” in interstate commerce under the se-
cond category.  Under this conception, rather than denying the 
channels of commerce to adulterated products, the regulation is try-
ing to “protect” the Pepsi soda itself as a thing in commerce.49  Final-
ly, sales of Pepsi soda “affect” interstate commerce in the aggregate, 
and therefore individual sales (including local sales at a local conven-
ience store) might be regulated under the third category as well, un-
der the theory that failure to regulate local sales would undercut the 
constitutionally valid regulation of the interstate market for soda.50 
To be sure, you could easily develop other scenarios slicing across 
the categories at different tangents.  Take, for instance, the archetyp-
al Memorial Day vacationer, who buys a PEPSI-branded soda at a gas 
station off the interstate.  The traveler herself, now, could be the 
“person” in interstate commerce (category two), who needs protect-
ing (as contrasted to the Pepsi which was previously considered the 
endangered “thing” in commerce).  And the “effect” on interstate 
commerce could be the effect, maybe, of the numbers of persons will-
ing to drive far distances for vacation (which might be reduced if you 
 
ble border crossings” and (2) “the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce.”  
The Significance of Border Crossings:  Lopez, Morrison and the Fate of Congressional Power to 
Regulate Goods, and Transactions Connected with Them, Based on Prior Passage Through Inter-
state Commerce, 61 MD. L. REV. 177, 186 (2002).  His argument is quite convincing on this 
point.  Where convenient, this article accordingly adopts Young’s formulation when it re-
fers to Congress’s power to regulate border crossings. 
 48 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911). 
 49 See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 154–56 (observing that under category two analysis, the federal 
government may pass a statute protecting against thefts from interstate shipments). 
 50 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)).  It is 
this third category of analysis that has been limited (to what degree remains disputed), by 
the Lopez and Morrison line of cases.  The key distinction drawn by the Court appears to be 
that Congress has more latitude to regulate economic, rather than non-economic, activi-
ties (with economic activities understood to involve the “production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities”).  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 720 (1966) (defining “economics”)). 
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could not safely, confidently, and quickly buy trusted beverages en 
route). 
Or we might alternatively hypothesize the branded good as a 
computer that may be connected to the Internet (say, an iPad).  This 
again implicates all three categories, but differently.  Now, the iPad is 
itself an instrumentality of commerce (as part of the Internet),51 in 
addition to traveling in (as it is shipped to the buyer)52 and affecting 
(via its usage or sale) interstate commerce. 
Service marks, too, cut across all the categories.53  For instance, 
take the BANK OF AMERICA mark used in connection with banking 
services.  It could be regulated to keep pure the channels of com-
merce (e.g., keeping the Internet free from confusingly similar 
online banking platforms).  It could be regulated to protect people in 
interstate commerce (a business traveler who visits an ATM to with-
draw cash while traveling).  And it could be regulated as banking ser-
vices on their face “affect” interstate commerce. 
One thing becomes clear from a glance at the above scenarios.  
Namely, current Commerce Clause jurisprudence casts such wide 
nets in so many directions that it is difficult to conceive of any good 
sold or service provided in the United States that cannot, by some ar-
gument or another, be snagged by Congress’s commerce power in 
the digital age.54  But contained within this vast conclusion is an es-
sential limitation.  Namely, in almost every case, the jurisdictional 
hook arises from the referent good or service, and not the trademark 
signifier as such. 
 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce as it is subject to congressional 
regulation). 
 52 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 649 (E.D. Mich. 
2001) (citing Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239–40 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(quoting 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.11[2], at 5–234 
(1996) (“Because Internet communications transmit instantaneously on a worldwide basis 
there is little question that the ‘in commerce’ requirement would be met in a typical In-
ternet message . . . .”))) (holding that things sold over or traveling through the Internet, 
such as domain names and e-mail messages, are things “in commerce”); see also Planetary 
Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
software distributed for end users over the Internet is a thing in commerce). 
 53 A service mark is a trademark used to distinguish one’s services rather than goods.  Bos. 
Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 n.8 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 54 This has led commentators such as Professor Thomas McCarthy to observe that “[i]t is 
difficult to conceive of an act of infringement which is not ‘in commerce’ in the sense of 
the modern decisions,” and to approvingly anticipate the “demise of the intrastate in-
fringement defense.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:57 (4th ed. 2014). 
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B. In Trademark Cases, the Court and United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) Generally Ask Whether the Referent Goods and Services 
are In Commerce or Affect Commerce 
As predicted by the foregoing considerations, Commerce Clause 
analysis in actual trademark cases, whether at the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) or in federal court, largely 
tracks the flow of goods and services with which the marks are used.55  
Historically, this was encouraged by the original, and still leading, 
application of the Commerce Clause to federal trademark regulation, 
the Trade-Mark Cases.56 
In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s original 
attempt to regulate trademarks under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution.57  Trademark regulation could not be 
based on that Clause because a trademark, unlike a patent or copy-
right, does not “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any 
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no 
laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropria-
tion.”58  As to the Commerce Clause, that could not save the original 
statute as “there is no hint that the goods are to be transported from 
 
 55 See generally id. §§ 25:53–57 (and cases cited therein).  Professor McCarthy’s treatise does 
not recognize a distinction between trademark signifiers and referents as it reviews 
Commerce Clause decisions in trademark cases.  However, consistent with the analysis in 
this section, the cases he cites tacitly reveal referents flowing in or affecting interstate 
commerce.  For instance, he cites the Eighth Circuit’s Coca-Cola infringement case.  See id. 
§ 25:56 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 1980)).  In that case, 
a local defendant restaurateur claimed that he was not subject to Lanham Act infringe-
ment liability for secretly substituting other colas when “Coca-Cola” and “Coke” were or-
dered by name in its purely local restaurants.  Id.  The Court (and McCarthy) rejected 
this argument on the basis that the substitutions had an effect on “interstate use of a 
trademark,” even if the infringing acts themselves occurred only locally, because the 
“trademark owner’s reputation and good will, built up by use of the mark in interstate 
commerce, are adversely affected by an intrastate infringement.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Like most trademark cases, further detailed below, this opinion suffers 
from ambiguity in failing to clarify exactly what element(s) of the trademark relationship 
were essential to affecting the commerce holding (i.e., the signifier, signified, referent, 
or, as it appears, some combination of the three).  Nevertheless, in the Coca-Cola case, as 
in most others, there clearly was an underlying referent good (here, the Coca-Cola soda 
product) flowing in more than one state.  See  MCCARTHY, supra note 54 § 19:123 
(“[T]here appears no statutory or Constitutional barrier to a holding that local sales are 
made ‘in commerce’ for trademark registration purposes if the sales are either made to 
interstate travelers or the sales involve the purchase of parts, materials or products from 
out of state.”). 
 56 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 57 Id. at 93–94. 
 58 Id. at 94. 
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one State to another.”59  Thus, the Court left open the possibility 
(soon acted upon by Congress) that a federal trademark statute could 
be constitutionally enacted if limited to goods that cross state lines. 
It is critical to recall, however, that this opinion was fundamentally 
limited in its scope—that is, it literally said nothing about a purely 
propertized trademark regime.  As indicated above,60 rather, it merely 
said that if a trademark regime was to be built around use with goods, 
then those goods must be in commerce.  It was intentionally agnostic 
as to alternative regimes.61 
Eschewing such alternatives, later trademark acts, including the 
Lanham Act itself, sensibly followed the clear path laid bare by the 
Trade-Mark Cases decision.  Like the 1870 Act, they were constructed 
around a goods and services model, but with the further requirement 
that those referents cross state lines.  In the language of the current 
Lanham Act, a trademark is only in “use in commerce” when “the 
goods are sold or transported in commerce.”62  Likewise, for service 
marks, use in commerce similarly requires that “the services are ren-
dered in commerce” or “the person rendering the services is engaged 
in commerce in connection with the services.”63 
Since the advent of the Lanham Act, Commerce Clause analysis in 
trademark cases has naturally followed this goods-and-services orient-
ed approach.64  For instance, in In re Gastown, Inc., the predecessor 
court to the Federal Circuit focused on the fact that a service station 
operator provided “automotive service and maintenance for custom-
ers who are traveling interstate on federal highways[,]” and thus its 
services were rendered “in commerce,” in determining that it was en-
 
 59 Id. at 97. 
 60 See supra note 17. 
 61 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96–97 (explaining that a valid congressional regulation 
of commerce under the Constitution would, on its face, indicate that it is a regulation of 
commerce with “foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes,” 
but not addressing other potential souces of authority for congressional regulations fall-
ing outside these categories). 
 62 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2) (emphasis added).  Of course, under the “affixation rule,” a label of 
the mark will normally be affixed to the goods or their packaging as those travel across 
state lines.  See generally Peter J. Karol, Affixing the Service Mark:  Reconsidering the Rise of an 
Oxymoron, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 357 (2013) (discussing the history and current 
application of affixation rule in trademark law).  Thus, the flow of a trademark’s referent 
across a state line will often, as a practical matter, entail that of its signifier as well. 
 64 For a useful overview of trademark cases applying the Commerce Clause prior to passage 
of the intent-to-use provisions, see Charles James Vinicombe, The Constitutionality of an In-
tent to Use Amendment to The Lanham Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 361 (1988). 
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titled to register its service mark.65  Also consistent with the model is 
the longstanding USPTO requirement that Internet usage of a 
trademark is considered mere advertising insufficient to substantiate 
registration unless there is a “means of ordering the goods directly 
from the applicant’s web page, such as a telephone number for plac-
ing orders or an online ordering process.”66  The ability to attain the 
underlying referent good or service over the Internet (or through 
some other channel of interstate commerce, such as the mail or 
phone) is key.67 
Under the same reasoning, an Italian car maker’s claim to trade-
mark rights under the Lanham Act was rejected where the evidence 
showed that not one of its cars was ever shipped to the United States 
or even sold to someone living in the United States.68  This result fol-
 
 65 326 F.2d 780, 782 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  The same sort of analysis is often used in the restau-
rant context, where a single-location restaurant owner is deemed to have attained federal-
ly protectable trademark rights by virtue of serving an interstate clientele.  See, e.g., Domi-
nic’s Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, No. 3:09–CV–131, 2009 WL 1045916, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 20, 2009) (explaining that the restaurant service mark in question was used in 
interstate commerce, as the restaurant served a substantial number of customers coming 
from “throughout the country”); see also Lebewohl v. Heart Attack Grill, LLC, 890 F. 
Supp. 2d 278, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (determining that the deli’s mark was used in and af-
fected interstate commerce because the deli, a celebrated tourist attraction, served many 
interstate travelers).  As discussed below with respect to Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 298 (1964), infra note 115, another consideration in these cases was the fact that the 
restaurants in question served food that had travelled in interstate commerce.  See 
Lebewohl, 890 F. Supp. 2d, at 292; Dominic’s, 2009 WL 1045916, at *5. 
 66 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Proce-
dure, § 904.03(i) (Jan. 2015)available at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/
TMEP_archives.jsp. 
 67 Id.  Cases do clarify that an actual purchase of the referent product is not essential to sur-
vive Commerce Clause analysis where the product is being distributed over the Internet, 
albeit for free.  See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194–95 
(11th Cir. 2001) (stating that a party may establish “use in commerce” even in the ab-
sence of sales).  Rendering of services directly over the Internet, such as the provision of 
news and information, is similarly considered sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause 
with respect to the associated trademark signifier.  Cable News Network, L.P. v. 
Cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“[I]t is clear that the provision of 
news and information services on the Internet constitutes commerce under the [Lan-
ham] Act.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am. v. Bucci, No. 97–CV–0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (“Inter-
net users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate tel-
ephone lines to access defendant’s web site on the Internet.  The nature of the Internet 
indicates that establishing a typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, 
would satisfy the Lanham Act’s ‘in commerce’ requirement.”). 
 68 Maruti.com v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 (D. Md. 2006).  Had the cars 
been sold to U.S. citizens but not shipped to the United States, they would likely have 
been considered to be “in commerce” by virtue of being in foreign trade, thereby being 
within both the “commerce with foreign nations” phrase of the Commerce Clause and 
the scope of the Lanham Act.  See Int’l. Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du 
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lowed even though it had a website that showed photos of the cars 
and information about them and allowed visitors, including U.S. visi-
tors, to enter their contact information if they were “planning to buy 
a car.”69  The court trained its focus on the location of the goods 
themselves. 
The same basic goods-and-service-focused approach usually holds 
in infringement suits, where the defendant questions federal asser-
tions of authority over its conduct.70  Even under an “affecting” com-
merce model in trademark cases,71 the inquiry traditionally remained 
analytically focused on whether the goods or services at issue had an 
 
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a casino’s 
mark was used in commerce because U.S. citizens had purchased casino services “sold by 
a subject of a foreign nation,” which constited “trade with a foreign nation that Congress 
may regulate”). 
 69 Maruti.com, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n.21.  Some courts are careful to emphasize in this 
context that simply because a defendant’s rendering of some service over the Internet sat-
isfies Commerce Clause requirements does not mean it necessarily did so “in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services” for 
purposes of Lanham Act infringement or unfair competition liability.  See, e.g., Savannah 
Coll. of Art & Design v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 942–948 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (explain-
ing that the trademark defendant’s mere provision of information over the Internet satis-
fies the Commerce Clause requirements but not the requirements of the Lanham Act). 
 70 For instance, in Thompson Tank & Mfg. Co.. v. Thompson, the federal appellate court af-
firmed the district court’s finding that the defendant failed to put its goods (in that case, 
large oil storage tanks) in interstate commerce, and thus was not subject to the Lanham 
Act under an “in commerce” rationale.  693 F.2d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 71 The Federal Circuit and USPTO were very late to accept an “affecting commerce” ra-
tionale for trademark cases.  Not until Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., in 
1991, did they recognize an applicant’s right to register marks used in connection with 
goods or services that merely affect commerce.  929 F.2d 662, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Pre-
viously, they had taken the statutory position that the Lanham Act reached only actual 
“commerce,” construing the Act in a manner narrower than the full extent permitted by 
the Constitution.  See, e.g., id. at 668–70 (Newman, J., dissenting) (advocating to keep the 
more limited original construction of the Lanham Act).  Many, including this author, be-
lieve that the dissent in Larry Harmon was right to locate such a statutory limitation in the 
Lanham Act based on the Act’s legislative history.  Nevertheless, this Article follows the 
great majority of courts in assuming that Congress intended to legislate to the full extent 
of its constitutional authority in the Lanham Act.  See, e.g., Maruti.com, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 
498 (quoting Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363–64) (“‘[C]ommerce’ under [the Lanham Act] 
is coterminus with that commerce which Congress may regulate under the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution.”); United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We 
Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The history and text of the Lan-
ham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of 
its authority under the Commerce Clause . . . .”).  But see Laurel Capital Grp., Inc. v. BT 
Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (quoting Licata & Co., Inc. v. Gold-
berg, 812 F. Supp. 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)) (adopting the view that the Lanham Act 
“does not extend to the full outer limits of the commerce power”). 
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effect on commerce.72  There is rarely mention, particularly in early 
cases, of trademarks (i.e., signifiers) as such.73 
Courts in trademark cases have more recently pushed “affecting 
commerce” jurisdiction to its logical extreme with respect to asser-
tions of Lanham Act jurisdiction over local defendants in the in-
fringement context.  In particular, most courts now hold that the 
scope of defendant’s use is effectively irrelevant so long as plaintiff’s 
use of its mark with its goods or services was interstate.74  It is immate-
 
 72 Thus, when the court in Thompson proceeded to address the “affecting” commerce as-
pects of the case, it again upheld the district court’s finding of no jurisdiction under the 
Lanham Act because defendant’s oil tank construction “activities did not affect the inter-
state commerce in which [the plaintiff] was engaged.”  Thompson, 693 F.2d at 993.  Of 
particular importance to the court was the fact that defendant was in the business of 
manufacturing mobile tanks mounted on trucks, whereas plaintiff built old-fashioned oil 
tanks.  This meant that it was unlikely that the activities in connection with the latter 
would affect the former.  Id. 
 73 Where the mark as such is mentioned explicitly, it is usually inextricably intertwined with 
referent goods and services.  See, e.g., Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 
678 F.2d 410, 413 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982) (acknowledging that false designation of origin 
claims, if proven against the defendants, may adversely affect plaintiff’s interstate busi-
ness); Mother Waddles Perpetual Mission, Inc. v. Frazier, 904 F. Supp. 603, 611 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995) (“[T]he interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement may be met by 
showing that the infringing mark was used in connection with goods in commerce, or 
that the defendant’s use, while instrastate, substantially affected interstate business.”); 
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that interstate 
contracts, even when a limited aspect of a business’s operations, are sufficient to establish 
that the plaintiffs were engaged in “interstate commerce”); Schroeder v. Lotito, Jr., 577 F. 
Supp. 708, 714 (D.R.I. 1983) (noting that the “use in commerce” requirement can be met 
either by a plaintiff demonstrating that the infringing mark, or the false designation or 
misrepresentation, was used in connection with goods in commerce or that defendant’s 
use, while wholly interstate, had a substantial effect on plaintiff’s interstate business); 
Kampgrounds of Am., Inc. v. N. Del. A-OK Campground, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 
(D. Del. 1976) (“[D]efendant’s facilities and those of [plaintiff’s] franchisees in Dela-
ware, [and] nearby [states] are competitive with each other . . . . Thus, if plaintiff were to 
establish that defendant’s mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers as to the 
true origin of defendant’s services, then defendant, to the extent it traded on plaintiff’s 
good will and took business away from [plaintiff’s] franchisees would be interfering with 
plaintiff’s interstate use of its marks.”). 
 74 See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 
(2d Cir. 1997) (citing Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 
(2d Cir. 1959)) (“Congress’s power to protect a plaintiff’s mark used in interstate com-
merce necessarily implies the power to regulate a defendant’s unauthorized use of the 
mark within a state’s borders.”); Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) (reaffirming the broad scope of the “in commerce” requirement under the Lan-
ham Act); SMJ Grp., Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (holding that defendant’s actions of distributing leaflets with plaintiff’s mark in an 
attempt to send a message about working conditions in restaurants qualifies as a “service” 
under the Lanham Act); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (“[T]here is no requirement that defendant must be infringing upon the mark in 
interstate commerce.”); see also Coca-Cola v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 1980) 
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rial, under these cases, whether and to what extent a defendant puts 
goods and services into commerce as the inquiry ends once a plaintiff 
qualifies for Lanham Act protection.  They simply assume, often 
without inquiry, that defendant’s accused activities have an effect on 
interstate commerce because they affect plaintiff’s trademark rights.75  
Congressional regulatory authority over infringement defendants 
under this theory is plenary so long as plaintiffs can establish that 
their trademarks qualify for federal protection (i.e., so long as plain-
tiffs can show that their marks were used with goods and services that 
were placed in, or affect, commerce).  The flow of goods and services 
remains embedded in this analysis, it just does so only on the plain-
tiff’s side of the ledger. 
One noteworthy exception to the general analytic focus on the 
flow and affect of referent goods and services is a line of cases that 
asks not whether goods or services are in, or affect, interstate com-
merce, but whether associated advertising is itself in commerce.76  
Support for this notion originally derives  from Tiffany & Co. v. Boston 
Club, Inc., a federal district court case in Massachusetts which offered 
two bases for concluding that a defendant’s allegedly infringing con-
duct came within the scope of § 43 of the Lanham Act. 77   First, it 
used a traditional “affecting commerce” argument along the lines of 
the cases above, finding that the Act reached defendant’s operation 
of a local restaurant named “Tiffany” because of its “damaging effect 
on plaintiff’s federally protected interstate business.”78  For no appar-
ent reason, however, the court went on to note, as an alternative 
ground, that jurisdiction could be established over defendant on the 
 
(“[J]urisdiction under the Lanham Act encompasses intrastate activity that substantially 
affects interstate commerce.”). 
 75 See, e.g., Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (“The interstate commerce jurisdictional predi-
cate for the Lanham Act merely requires a party to show that the defendant’s conduct af-
fects interstate commerce, such as through diminishing the plaintiff’s ability to control 
use of the mark, thereby affecting the mark and its relationship to interstate com-
merce.”); SMJ Grp., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 286–87 (holding that plaintiffs are likely to 
show that defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ marks is in commerce because the plaintiff busi-
nesses “engage in interstate commerce—commerce that is alleged to be adversely affect-
ed by defendants’ use of their trademarks”). 
 76 See generally Christopher J. Schulte, Abracadabra Int’l, Ltd. v. Abracadabra Creations, 
Inc.—Internet Advertising Just Federalized the Nation’s Service Mark Law!, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 
563 (1999) (discussing the expansion of the “use in commerce” requirement for service 
marks and the shift toward recognizing interstate advertising of a service mark as suffi-
cient to place the service in commerce). 
 77 231 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D. Mass. 1964). 
 78 Id. 
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basis that the advertising for its restaurant was itself in interstate 
commerce, even if the restaurant itself was purely local.79 
Tiffany may be read narrowly as standing for the limited proposi-
tion that interstate advertising may be circumstantial evidence that 
defendants are rendering an interstate service (i.e., drawing clientele 
from other states).  Later cases, however, expanded on Tiffany,80 lead-
ing ultimately to a Trademark Board decision which held that inter-
state advertising by itself supported federal registration, without other 
evidence of an effect on commerce,81 and federal court opinions that 
rely solely on interstate advertising to support jurisdiction.82  Varia-
tions of the notion continue to surface in broad, ambiguous dicta in 
some recent cases.83 
The exact reach of these pure advertising cases remains unclear.  
In the earlier decisions on which the line of reasoning is based, the 
advertising portion was not essential for any holdings.84  Moreover, 
 
 79 Id. (“[D]efendant’s business is sufficiently interstate to supply a basis for federal jurisdic-
tion if the above-cited grounds were not available, by reason of the fact that defendant 
has advertised on several radio stations and one television station which engage in multi-
state transmissions, has placed advertisements in newspapers circulated in Massachusetts 
and several other states, and has utilized billboards located on interstate highways.”). 
 80 Tiffany was first followed by another federal district court case concerning unfair competi-
tion.  See Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293, 298 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).  
The court again used the existence of a defendant’s interstate advertising as an alterna-
tive basis for applying the Lanham Act to defendants’ intrastate restaurant business.  Id.  
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, in Abracadabra Int’l, Ltd. v. Abracadabra Creations 
Inc., then extended this approach to a registration priority contest, also in an alternative 
holding not necessary for its ruling, when it opined that “advertising of services in inter-
state commerce places the services in such commerce.”  172 U.S.P.Q. 142, 144 (T.T.A.B. 
1971).  A federal district court in New York similarly factored interstate advertising into its 
decision (but did not rely solely on that point) in determining that a motion to dismiss 
was too early, procedurally, to decide the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  B & B St. 
James Pub, Inc. v. Hod O’Brien Rest. Corp., 189 U.S.P.Q. 732, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see al-
so Berghoff Rest. Co., Inc. v. Lewis W. Berghoff, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 127, 130 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 
1973) (citing Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. at 843) (holding that interstate advertising is sufficient 
to meet Commerce Clause). 
 81 See United States Shoe Corp. v. J. Riggs West, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1022 n.6 (T.T.A.B. 
1984).  The applicant’s intrastate billiard parlor services were mentioned alongside the 
applied-for mark in advertisements running in more than one state.  Id. 
 82 See Lobo Enter., Inc. v. Tunnel, Inc., 822 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that signif-
icant advertising in interstate travel guides is commerce that Congress may regulate 
where entertainment service is rendered locally). 
 83 See, e.g., Bros. of the Wheel M.C. Exec. Council, Inc. v. Mollohan, 909 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
537 (S.D. W.Va. 2012) (quoting Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du 
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A]dvertising is itself 
commerce that Congress may regulate.”). 
 84 In both Tiffany and Burger King, the primary holding that a defendant’s conduct falls with-
in the reach of the Lanham Act so long as it affects plaintiff’s concededly interstate busi-
ness is consistent with later cases that assert Lanham Act jurisdiction over infringement 
defendants by the mere fact that plaintiffs have used the subject mark in commerce.  See, 
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they have been criticized on the ground that they do not appear to 
follow the language of the Lanham Act, cited above, which focuses on 
the use of goods and services.85  It is also difficult to evaluate whether 
the advertising was deemed sufficient because the mark, the service, 
or both, were interstate.86  And some of the reasoning shown in the 
cases is based on statutory, not constitutional grounds.87  In the end, 
the cases are probably best understood as using interstate advertising 
as circumstantial evidence that the service is being rendered, under 
the subject mark, to customers who travel from other states, and are 
thus a variation of the “border-crossing” cases discussed below.88 
IV. CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TRADEMARKS IN 
CONNECTION TO GOOD AND SERVICE REFERENTS IS NOT COEXTENSIVE 
WITH ITS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TRADEMARK SIGNIFIERS 
As has been shown, Commerce Clause analysis in trademark cases 
has largely flowed with referent goods and services thanks in no small 
part to the suggestion in the Trade-Mark Cases that such an approach 
would be constitutional if the referent goods and services were in 
commerce.  Where the trademark owner’s referent goods and ser-
vices cross borders, or are delivered along a channel of commerce 
(e.g., highway service station), or ordered through a channel of 
commerce (Internet), or simply affect commerce, the courts find that 
 
e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (noting that Congress’s power to protect a plaintiff’s mark used in interstate 
commerce implies the power to regulate defendant’s unauthorized intrastate use of the 
mark). 
 85 Schulte, supra note 76, at 582–85.  This criticism is supported by the legislative history of 
the Lanham Act.  For instance, one of the more extended debates over the “use in com-
merce” provision occurred over whether mere advertising should be allowed to support 
service mark use (with detractors arguing for an additional requirement that the service 
mark be used in connection with provision of the service itself).  See Karol, supra note 63, 
at 385–87.  Ultimately, a compromise was reached wherein mere advertising would sup-
port service mark use, but the underlying service to which the advertisement referred was 
required to be rendered in commerce.  Id.  Accordingly, advertising alone was never in-
tended to suffice as a constitutional hook, for Commerce Clause purposes, by the original 
drafters of the Act. 
 86 In United States Shoe, for instance, it is clear that the ads contained both.  221 U.S.P.Q. at 
1022 n.6. 
 87 See, e.g., Laurel Capital Grp. v. BT Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478 (W.D. Pa. 1999) 
(analyzing the “plain meaning” of the term “in commerce”). 
 88 As discussed in Part VI(A), to the extent these holdings assert that national advertising 
alone is sufficient to meet contemporary Commerce Clause requirements, disconnected 
from the interstate sale of effect of referent goods or services, the author disagrees that 
early precedent supports such a position. 
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Congress has extensive, perhaps plenary, authority to regulate those 
goods and services.89 
Congress, under the basic Raich-type analysis discussed above, may 
use the means of a federal trademark registration system to accom-
plish its goal of protecting these goods and services crossing state 
borders or affecting commerce.  That is, it may decide that it can best 
protect the trademark referents through the grant of exclusive na-
tional rights in trademark signs via a federal registration system and 
by providing a cause of action for infringement of unregistered 
marks.  Such a system, after all, is designed to prevent confusion in 
the purchase of these goods and services and to encourage the 
maintenance of strong quality standards for them.  As such, this 
trademark regulatory regime is a close conceptual cousin of food and 
drug regulation.  And just as does the latter, the former easily survives 
Commerce Clause analysis.  The means are clearly a rational way of 
regulating information transmitted about goods or services to con-
sumers and protecting their quality. 
This explanation, though convincing within its scope, fails to ac-
count for trademark propertization—Congress’s decision, as under-
stood by the federal courts, to grant property rights to trademark sig-
nifiers separate and apart from referent goods or services.90  It would 
be a fallacy to reason that because Congress has the authority to regu-
late trademark signifiers in connection with goods and services, it also 
necessarily has the authority to regulate them standing alone.  The 
nature of this fallacy is clearly shown by analogy to food and drug la-
beling regulation. 
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may require (and long 
has required) clear and accurate labeling of foods or drugs trans-
 
 89 This was the understanding of the drafters of the Lanham Act as to its constitutionality; 
this is illustrated by the comments of Edward S. Rogers, one of the firmest proponents of 
the Lanham Act, during a 1928 hearing.  See Trade-Marks:  Hearing on H.R. 6683 and H.R. 
11988 Before the Comm. on Patents, 70th Cong. 54–55 (1928) (statement of Stoughton Bell).  
Representative Lanham asked for the constitutional basis for adding in a provision pro-
tecting service marks.  Id. at 54.  Rogers answered with the example of a laundromat in 
Maryland, which cleans clothes at one location but then ships the cleaned clothes to vari-
ous states; the laundromat does not sell the clothes as goods but merely cleans them as a 
service.  Id.  According to Rogers, this laundering service was rendered in interstate 
commerce (even though the mark did not travel with the clothes themselves) because the 
service was provided over a state line.  Id. at 54–55.  Thus it followed for Rogers that 
marks used in connection with “concerns of that sort” may be protected “under registra-
tion law.”  Id. at 55. 
 90 See, e.g., Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2 at 904 (“[A]lthough that justifies why 
Congress might have had original authority to regulate trademarks as used on actual 
goods or services, it does not justify expanding that regulation to include the subjective 
understanding or impression of trademarks as they exist in the minds of the citizenry.”). 
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ported across state lines.91  As part of this regulatory scheme, it may 
further control the possession or resale of mislabeled foods and drugs 
previously shipped across state lines,92 including those by a defendant 
who bought the products solely by local sale from a wholesaler, six 
months after the original interstate shipment.93  It may also control 
the process by which the foods and drugs are manufactured and ini-
tially labeled, prior to any interstate shipment, including through 
regulation of the employment practices used by the manufacturer or 
labeler.94  It may even control the labeling of foods and drugs solely 
for private in-state consumption by a private individual, if failure to 
regulate that local class of activities would undercut the overall food 
and drug regulatory scheme.95 
What, though, if Congress attempts to expand its regulatory reach 
to label typefaces in general?  Imagine that Congress, for instance, 
passes an amendment to the Food and Drug Act requiring that all la-
bels containing text in the United States use Times New Roman font 
in a size at least fourteen-point or larger.  The justification is simply 
that this makes all labels easier to read.  Because the statute is unlim-
ited, it includes not just food and drug labels, but also the use of 
price stickers applied to artisan platters at a local craft store, generic 
and premade “Hello, My Name Is” labels, children’s stickers, and 
even office nameplates to name a few.  In such a case, Congress could 
not defend the statute as a rational means for regulating the clear 
and accurate labeling of foods and drugs.  The latter is no longer the 
“class of activities” it is seeking to regulate, the relevant class having 
been broadened substantially to labels in general.96 
 
 91 See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 697–98 (1948) (noting the power of Congress 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the branding of items that have completed an 
interstate shipment and are now being held for future sales in local or intrastate com-
merce); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 128–131 (1913) (arguing that Congress’s 
power to require the correct branding of foods transported across state lines relates to its 
authority to keep the channels of commerce free from the transportation of harmful or 
illicit materials). 
 92 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911). 
 93 Sullivan, 332 U.S. at 696–98. 
 94 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941). 
 95 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (“Congress can regulate purely intrastate ac-
tivity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that 
failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity.”). 
 96 As explored below, the question of whether a regulation is “constitutionally deficient” 
must remain centered around “the larger regulatory scheme,” properly defined.  Raich, 
545 U.S. at 26.  Raich was something of the exact inverse situation, as the error made by 
the lower appellate court in that case was in defining the class too narrowly—rather than 
too broadly—for constitutional purposes.  Id.  Specifically, by wrongly defining the sub-
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This is not to say that the new statute could never be authorized 
under the Commerce Clause.  Rather, we would need to conduct a 
new Commerce Clause analysis, this time focused on labels them-
selves, to make that determination.  As detailed in Part V below, we 
would need to ask whether the statute is limited to labels shipped, or 
to be shipped, in interstate commerce, or perhaps ordered over the 
Internet.97  If not, we would then ask, does the production, dissemina-
tion, and possession of those labels have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce?  If the answer is no, then we might still be able to 
save the statute (or its application in specific instances) if Congress 
can show, for those labels that do not substantially affect interstate 
commerce, that it is rational for Congress to regulate them in the 
context of regulating the entire interstate market for labels.98  The 
key point is that this latter analysis is centered around the regulation 
of labels, as labels, and not the regulation of foods and drugs.  Con-
gress’s authority to regulate the market for foods and drugs is not log-
ically coextensive with its authority to regulate the market in labels, 
even if fair labeling is one important aspect of food and drug regula-
tion.99 
The next section accordingly seeks to stitch, largely out of whole 
cloth, a viable account for the extension of congressional authority to 
pure trademark propertization. 
 
ject class too narrowly, the lower appellate court understood the subject class as noneco-
nomic and noncommercial and thus wrongly held the broader statute unconstitutional as 
applied to that narrower class.  Id.  Nevertheless, the key point is that the definition of the 
“class of activities” being regulated is always a critical threshold predicate to Commerce 
Clause analysis.  See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (noting that the 
“measure” in Commerce Clause analysis is the “class of activities regulated”); San Luis & 
Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Pursuant to 
Raich, when a statute is challenged under the Commerce Clause, courts must evaluate the 
aggregate effect of the statute (rather than an isolated application) in determining 
whether the statute relates to ‘commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.’”); United 
States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he class of activity is the rele-
vant unit of analysis . . . .”); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1110 n.16 (9th Cir. 
2006) (cautioning that the subject statute can survive category three Commerce Clause 
analysis as to one class of activities without necessarily surviving as to another class of ac-
tivities). 
 97 See infra Part V. 
 98 See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 (holding that Congress acted rationally in determining that 
a narrower class of activities was an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme). 
 99 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (arguing that the 
compelled purchase of health insurance is not properly regarded as regulation of health 
care financing, even if the two are “inherently integrated,” because they involve different 
transactions, timing, and providers). 
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V. LOCATING CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO PROPERTIZE TRADEMARKS 
A. Arguments Justifying Federal Regulation of Trademark Signifiers Under 
Traditional Commerce Clause Analysis 
I. Category One Analysis 
Trademark signifiers are not literally “channels” of interstate 
commerce (in the sense of highways or waterways).  They certainly, 
however, appear on such channels, insofar as they are displayed on 
the Internet and in television advertisements and spoken about on 
the radio.  Under category one, then, we might seek to locate con-
gressional authority to regulate trademark signifiers, divorced from 
any connection to goods and services under its authority to regulate 
the Internet and national communications as channels of commerce. 
In the Internet or televised media context, we might reason that 
Congress clearly has the right, subject to First Amendment and other 
considerations, to regulate the content of what is shown on television 
or the Internet; indeed it has authorized creation of an administrative 
agency, the FCC, to do so.100  If I create a new logo or adopt a term as 
my company’s trademark and then promote it heavily during the Su-
per Bowl in some humorous ad that makes no attempt to associate 
the new brand with any good or service, why can’t Congress (through 
its Commerce Clause authority to regulate national communication 
channels) grant me the exclusive rights to use that logo or word? 
There are two problems with this theory for congressional trade-
mark propertization authority.  The first is that, by its own terms, it is 
limited to regulation of national communication channels.  It could 
not justify, by itself, reaching the use of the imitative toile monogram 
logo by Hyundai, for instance, on posters at its car dealerships.  The 
latter would still need to be reached by an additional “affecting 
commerce” theory. 
Perhaps a more substantial difficulty, though, is that content-
based congressional regulations of what is shown on television and 
other media are intentionally viewed with heavy suspicion.  They 
must be given “intermediate scrutiny, asking whether the restriction 
was narrowly tailored to advance a substantial government interest.”101  
 
100 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376–77, 
399 (1984) (noting that, subject to regulatory oversight by Congress, the FCC has the au-
thority to grant licenses for the use of broadcast frequencies to serve the public’s right to 
be informed on matters of public importance). 
101 See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380 (“[T]hese restrictions have been upheld 
only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial 
 
Apr. 2015] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON TRADEMARK 1091 
 
Thus, if we are to locate congressional authority to regulate trade-
mark signifiers as an offshoot of its right to regulate national media 
content, separate from any underlying commercial transactions, that 
authority will be heavily circumscribed by countervailing free speech 
considerations (in a manner more pointed than that usually given to 
trademark regulations connected with goods and services).102 
Congress would, moreover, have difficulty justifying the grant of 
an exclusive right in trademark signifiers that merely appear on tele-
vision, separate and apart from any goods or services, as narrowly tai-
lored to achieve an important objective.  Given the breadth of such a 
regulation, the objective would need to be defined as something like 
“encouraging the creation and marketing of logos and brand names.”  
But, as Mark Lemley persuasively argues, that is hardly a reasonable 
goal standing alone.103  Rather, protecting logos and brands is just a 
further means to controlling information about goods and services in 
the marketplace and the quality of those goods and services.  Trade-
marks are not necessarily original, creative contributions to society 
that we might wish to encourage for their own sake, like patents and 
copyrights.104 
II.  Category Two Analysis 
Turning to an analysis under category two, trademark signifiers 
could alternately be described as things in interstate commerce, or a 
 
governmental interest . . . .”); Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (con-
struing League of Women Voters as holding that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate be-
cause the object of the anti-editorial statute was content). 
102 Trademark infringement regulations generally do not require heightened constitutional 
review on the theory that they are designed to prevent commercial fraud in consumer 
transactions involving the sale of goods and services, and the First Amendment does not 
protect against commercial fraud.  Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980)). 
103 See Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 1, at 1694 (“We don’t protect trademarks to 
encourage the creation of more trademarks, and so the incentive rationale for intellectu-
al property will not work here.”). 
104 Although outside the scope of this Article, the First Amendment might prove, for similar 
reasons, a fertile alternative ground for a constitutional attack on an attempt to 
propertize the nation’s trademark regime, separate and apart from any limit to Con-
gress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause.  In particular, it could be 
argued that any attempt to protect a trademark’s signifier, disassociated from goods and 
services, is on its face a pure regulation of speech (i.e., symbols) without any countervail-
ing substantial interest (as contrasted, for instance, with the countervailing interests and 
exceptions underlying copyright law).  See Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 1, at 
1694–95.  In other words, Congress may not be in the business of regulating language for 
language’s sake.  The author is indebted to Ralph Clifford for this observation. 
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way of protecting things and people in commerce, or even as instru-
mentalities of things in commerce.105 Might any of these characteriza-
tions support congressional authority to regulate trademark signifi-
ers? 
Taking the second characterization first, it quickly collapses upon 
the limitation Congress would be trying to avoid:  namely, it depends 
on a connection to tangible goods and services referents with which 
trademarks are used.  Trademarks, conventionally understood, pro-
tect people and things in commerce by assuring such people (like the 
quintessential highway vacationer or commercial traveler)106 that they 
are buying the good or service that they mean to be buying, and that 
the good or service will be of an expected quality.107  If the good or 
service is removed from the equation, and we just seek to protect 
trademark signifiers as such, then this fails to protect these customers 
from anything.  Vacationers using highways are not protected by dilu-
tion law, brand-owners are.  By definition, there is no confusion. 
Certainly an alternative justification for trademark law is the pro-
tection of brand-owners themselves (say, Nike, Inc. or Louis Vuitton).  
It assures them that they will receive the “financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product.”108  The question here, 
though, is not whether trademark law properly protects brand-owners 
in addition to customers, but rather whether such brand-owners are 
things or people in commerce in the meaning of category two analy-
sis.  Except under an unreasonably broad reading of a border-
crossing case such as Katzenbach v. McClung,109 multinational corpora-
 
105 Edward S. Rogers, a leading advocate for the Lanham Act legislation before Congress, 
long ago advanced a close variation of this argument in House Committee hearings on an 
early version of the Act.  In particular, in defense of Congress’s ability to regulate trade-
mark law, he likened trademarks to the psychological equivalent of railway cars:  
“[T]rade-marks are what move goods from the manufacturer to the consumer.  It is the 
confidence that people have in articles marked in a certain way that makes the public buy 
them.  Consequently, it is just as much a means of getting goods from the manufacturer 
to the consumer as the railroads and trucks are which provide the physical transportation.  
Trade-marks are an instrumentality of commerce, just exactly as means of transportation 
are, and if Congress can regulate the means, the objective means of transportation, they 
can regulate the subjective means of transportation.”  Trade-marks:  Hearing on H.R. 9041 
Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 51 (1938) (statement 
of Edward S. Rogers). 
106 See, e.g., Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 666 (1991) 
(stating that a single-location restaurateur who locally uses a trademark with its intrastate 
services may attain federal trademark registration by virtue of serving at least some cus-
tomers that travelled across state boundaries). 
107 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). 
108 Id. 
109 379 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1964) (finding that a refusal to serve customers based on race im-
pacts the overall number of customers served, thereby reducing the amount of food 
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tions, as legal entities, are not persons or things in commerce to be 
protected in the meaning of category two.110 
This takes us then to the argument that trademark signifiers, as 
such, are “things” in commerce that Congress may protect.  Just as we 
saw that Congress may keep impure eggs,111 or wrongly labeled medi-
cines,112 out of the interstate commercial channels, we might argue 
that Congress may prohibit knock-off trademark signifiers from en-
tering them. 
This could arise in a few ways.  The simplest and most convincing 
approach is to argue that trademark signifiers flow in the nation’s 
commercial channels when goods to which they are affixed are 
shipped through those channels.113  The immediate difficulty here, of 
course, is that we are back to being limited by goods and services, as 
this analysis hinges on the underlying good or service being shipped 
across a state line.  An important line of constitutional criminal cases, 
however, gives Congress some freedom to regulate just the signifier in 
this regard. 
In particular, a number of appellate courts following Lopez have 
concluded that the federal government might criminalize simple gun 
possession merely because that gun once moved in interstate com-
merce.114  Under this theory, as scholars have considered it, once a ju-
risdictional predicate of a border crossing occurs, Congress can argue 
 
bought and sold by the restaurant and impacting interstate commerce as a whole).  As 
discussed below, one could argue that under Katzenbach the receipt and use of materials 
shipped from another state (there, food) essentially subjected the restaurant to federal 
regulation for all purposes.  One could try to extend this to a Nike or Louis Vuitton and 
argue that as these entities receive raw materials from other states, the companies are “in 
commerce” for all purposes.  As Young suggests, however, this would allow category two 
analysis to take over Commerce Clause inquiry, which surely cannot be the intent of Lopez 
and related cases.  See Young, supra note 47, at 210–11. 
110 Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (narrowly construing a federal arson 
statute to avoid a broad reading that would have necessitated the constitutionally prob-
lematic conclusion that any building that receives natural gas from another state, or is 
paid for with a federally regulated mortgage, is a thing in commerce). 
111 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911). 
112 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 633, 697–98 (1948). 
113 The current statutory “affixation” rule requires in most cases that a federally registered 
trademark signifier be physically affixed to the good in question as it travels in commerce, 
making it quite likely that any trademark signifier that has qualified for Lanham Act pro-
tection was in fact attached to its referent product when crossing a state line.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2012) (definition of “use in commerce”).  Service marks might also be connected 
to services rendered across state lines, such as when a Peter Pan Bus ferries passengers 
from Boston to New York with a distinctive logo on its side. 
114 See generally DENNING, supra note 43, § 5.04[I][1][a] (listing cases following Lopez). 
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that federal law may follow the material that crossed state lines “like 
bubble gum stuck to a shoe.”115 
We might then extend this analysis to trademark signifiers.  Like a 
person carrying a gun over a border, we might view goods as carrying 
their trademark signifiers over the line.  Once that occurs, under the 
border-crossing theory, we can argue that federal law sticks to the 
signifier even if later separated from the good (just as federal law 
sticks to the gun even if the defendant was not the one who brought 
it over the state line).116 
There are problems with this theory.  The first is that its reach is 
controversial, even in the criminal gun possession context.  Scholars 
such as Gordon Young have pointed out that under such a broad 
theory of category one and two “there is little in modern American 
life that Congress cannot regulate, including events having no future 
effect on interstate commerce.”117  Theoretically, under such logic, 
once a person crosses a state boundary, or eats food shipped over the 
line, anything he does is subject to federal regulation for the remain-
der of his life.118  Category one and two analysis would thus complete-
ly swallow the other categories.  Second, this border-crossing theory 
still requires a good or service at some point to carry a signifier over a 
state line.  This means that any dilution law, for instance, must be 
tethered (even if remotely) to some interstate good or service.  And it 
also means that the hypothetical purely propertized federal trade-
 
115 Young, supra note 47, at 180.  Young also suggests that Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964), a Civil Rights Act racial discrimination case, can be read to support the same 
principle.  Young, supra note 47, at 199, 211.  The Court in Katzenbach arguably affirmed 
Congress’s right to regulate discrimination at a purely local restaurant under the theory 
that the restaurant served food that previously crossed a state border.  Id. at 199 (citing 
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298–99).  Contemporary courts continue to advance such evidence 
as a factor supporting Lanham Act jurisdiction in restaurant service mark cases.  See 
Lebewohl v. Heart Attack Grill, LLC, 890 F. Supp. 2d 278, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding 
that jurisdiction is satisfied because the deli purchased a large amount of ingredients 
from out-of-state vendors); Dominic’s Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, No. 3:09-cv-131, 
2009 WL 1045916, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2009) (regulating restaurant in part on the 
basis that “a substantial portion of the food and supplies used by [it] moved in interstate 
commerce”).  Federal law appears in these cases to travel with the food over the border, 
and then seep into the host restaurant generally. 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (reaffirming the con-
tinuing validity, post-Lopez, of the rule in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 
(1977), that required “proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate 
commerce is sufficient” to establish a legitimate nexus to intersate commerce). 
117 Young, supra note 47, at 180. 
118 Id. at 211–12.  But cf. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2648 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But if every person comes within the Commerce Clause power of 
Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he will one day engage in commerce, the 
idea of a limited Government power is at an end.”). 
Apr. 2015] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON TRADEMARK 1095 
 
mark statute introduced at the outset of this Article would remain 
unconstitutional. 
At a slightly higher level of abstraction, to further distance oneself 
from the yoke of goods or services, one might argue that the trade-
mark signifiers (in the sense of labels, hangtags, stickers, or patches) 
themselves might be “things” in commerce.119  The Louis Vuitton 
toile monogram, the argument might go, is a thing in commerce that 
is harmed when Hyundai appropriates it for the design of a basket-
ball in a commercial about the meaning of luxury.  Thus Congress is 
free to protect that thing, apart from any connection to goods and 
services.  The logo itself is the defenseless passenger travelling on our 
highways, the sensitive medicine being shipped interstate, the inse-
cure email sent over the Internet to be protected from tamper. 
In a certain sense, this seems like a simple definitional question 
over the meaning of a “thing.”  Surely such an amorphous term is 
loose enough to fit a standalone trademark signifier, particularly if we 
want Congress, for policy reasons, to be able to regulate these things 
at a national level.  This is essentially the logic used in the well-known 
merchandising case, Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Manufacturing, where the defendant was in the business of 
selling emblems or patches of professional hockey teams, unaffixed 
to any goods.120  The court simply assumed in passing that these em-
blems were in “interstate commerce” before proceeding to its analysis 
on the merits.121 
As Barton Beebe explains about the case, while the court facially 
considered the physical “fabric and thread” of the patches to be the 
good subject to regulation, that was really just a pretext.  In fact, 
“[t]he defendant’s ‘fabric and thread’ is not the product that the 
consumer seeks, nor is any other material object.  The product that is 
being sold is the plaintiff’s signified, its goodwill, its positive affect, 
commodified in the form of the plaintiff’s signifier.”122  Thus, in the 
 
119 One federal appeals court has indeed stated in dicta, without analysis or explanation, that 
“trademarks are an instrumentality of commercial intercourse and the provision of the 
services necessarily involves both channels of and instrumentalities of that commercial in-
tercourse.”  Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe Des Bains De Mer et Du Cercle Des Etrangers a 
Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2003).  This statement, made in the context applying 
the Lanham Act to foreign trade, encompasses in one breath both trademarks as such (in 
the signifier sense) and the provision of referent services.  The court likely did not mean 
to suggest that trademarks could be an instrumentality of commerce disassociated from 
those referent services. 
120 510 F.2d 1004, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 1975). 
121 Id. at 1011. 
122 Beebe, supra note 15, at 659. 
1096 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
patch, we might see an effectively referentless trademark signifier that 
flows in commerce (and is therefore subject to congressional regula-
tion). 
The difficulty with this model, however, is that it proves too much.  
At heart, the argument suggests that if I put the word “LOVE” on a 
letter and ship it to my grandmother in Florida, or tweet “LOVE” 
over the Internet, then Congress has plenary authority to regulate us-
es of that word under the Commerce Clause.  It converts the federal 
courts into regulators of pure language and symbols once the word 
travels from one state to another. 
For something like this reason, later courts intentionally limited 
Boston Professional Hockey to the situation where the patch was intend-
ed for a specific good.123  Although on statutory and not constitution-
al Commerce Clause grounds, the court in United States v. Giles, as 
Beebe points out, thus determined that a freestanding patch was not 
a “good” for criminal purposes under the Lanham Act.124  The Giles 
Court’s palpable discomfort with regulating trademark signifiers 
apart from goods in commerce thus brings us back, ineluctably, to 
the goods-and-services anchor. 
Perhaps the saving limitation in the real world is that trademark 
signifiers we wish to protect are generally connected, or at least were 
at some point, to goods and services in commerce.  The toile mono-
gram certainly appeared on many goods flowing through interstate 
commerce (i.e., on luggage).  Thus, the signifiers we are seeking to 
protect are categorically different from abstract terms like “LOVE.”  
Yet again, though, this has left us grasping in our Commerce Clause 
analysis at the goods and services themselves as an absolute require-
ment for congressional regulation. 
III. Category Three Analysis 
Category three, directly at issue in the Lopez line of cases, author-
izes Congress to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
 
123 United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting, of Boston Prof’l Hock-
ey, that “[T]he Fifth Circuit specifically confined its opinion to the product at hand: ‘We 
need not deal here with the concept of whether every artistic reproduction of the symbol 
would infringe upon plaintiffs’ rights.  We restrict ourselves to the emblems sold princi-
pally through sporting goods stores for informal use by the public in connection with 
sports activities . . . .’”). 
124 Giles, 213 F.3d at 1251. 
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commerce.125  After Raich, the question is simply whether “Congress 
could have rationally concluded that the regulation of [the local ac-
tivity] was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”126 
Under this rule, for instance, a purely local restaurant defendant 
might be made subject to Lanham Act infringement claims for secret-
ly substituting one soda for another if these purely intrastate acts nev-
ertheless affect interstate commerce (by affecting the interstate oper-
ations of that national soda brand).127  This is because Congress could 
rationally have concluded that it needed to prohibit even trivial intra-
state misuses of a trademark in order to maintain a comprehensive 
scheme of consumer-confusion prevention in the restaurant indus-
try.128 
Scholars who have previously addressed the constitutional ques-
tion in relation to trademark propertization, in particular Kenneth 
Port, have understandably focused their attention on this open-ended 
category.129  Professor Port’s analysis, published in 2000, and there-
fore prior to current leading cases such as Raich, attempts to distin-
guish earlier expansive category three cases as limited to “actual, 
physical conduct occurring, or actual physical or financial harms or 
penalties being suffered because of that conduct.”130  By contrast, Pro-
 
125 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (noting that case law “firmly establishes” 
Congress’s power to regulate local activities that are part of an economic class of activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce).  In Justice Antonin Scalia’s view, articulated 
in his concurring opinion in Raich, Congress may further regulate even “intrastate activity 
[that] does not itself ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce” where it is “essential to a 
comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
This extends, for Justice Scalia, even to the regulation of noneconomic local activity:  
“The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to 
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”  Id. (citing United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). 
126 Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 26–27). 
127 See, e.g., Coca-Cola v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 291–92 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that even if 
the alleged acts of infringement did not cause the mark owner a large loss in sales, this 
did not detract from the fact that the misappropriation of good will had a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce). 
128 Id. at 290–91 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28) (1942)). 
129 Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 904–10 (discussing the third category of 
Lopez-style Commerce clause analysis:  the “substantial relationship to interstate com-
merce”). 
130 Id. at 904 (explaining that in other cases where Commerce Clause legislation has been 
upheld by the Supreme Court, the conduct and harm were both actual and physical, 
whereas recent expansions to trademark law, such as the introduction of an intent to use 
scheme, concern hypothetical conduct).  See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981) (explaining that Congress has the authority, 
under the Commerce Clause, to prevent harmful interstate competition); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (noting that questions of congressional authority under 
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fessor Port continues, recent trademark expansions such as the in-
tent-to-use regime and dilution involve situations where the market, 
goods, and services are “hypothetical” and thus constitutionally sus-
pect.131 
This actual/hypothetical distinction doesn’t appear to survive the 
broad reasoning of Raich.  Raich makes it clear that Congress only 
needs a rational basis for concluding that its regulation of even non-
economic local activity is a rational means of regulating products in 
commerce.132  There would seem to be no reason, under Raich, why 
an intent-to-use regime could not be considered a rational means to 
attain the legitimate end of regulating goods and services in com-
merce.  After all, the applicant is swearing that it has “a bona fide in-
tention to use” the applied-for mark in commerce with the claimed 
goods and services.133  The early application process just helps smooth 
out the path to bringing branded products to market by creating an 
orderly process for securing rights while the final product is being 
completed, without fear of being scooped by a competitor.  The fact 
that the pre-use filing might be “hypothetical” seems irrelevant under 
Raich.134  That said, Professor Port’s basic insight that the actual sale 
or rendering of goods and services must still enter the equation at 
some point--even under Raich--remains entirely valid as detailed be-
low. 
Key to engaging in an affects analysis of this sort is first defining 
the legitimate end that Congress is seeking to achieve (such as con-
trol of wheat or drugs flowing through the country).135  What, then, is 
 
the Commerce Clause must take into account the actual effects the activity in question 
has on interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 
(1937) (holding that congressional authority to protect interstate commerce is not lim-
ited to transactions that are an essential part of interstate commerce). 
131 Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 905. 
132 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); see also id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)) (arguing that the means must be “rea-
sonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end”). 
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). 
134 Interestingly, some language in Sebelius can be read to support an actual/hypothetical 
distinction, at least where there is a large temporal gap between the two.  Chief Justice 
John Roberts, for instance, rejects “the proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct 
of an individual today because of prophesied future activity . . . .”  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012).  In Sebelius, the expectation at issue was that 
healthy individuals will later in life engage in a healthcare transaction.  Id.  However, as 
discussed below, that discussion relates more to the distinction between the regulation 
and creation of commerce.  Id. at 2591.  In the intent-to-use context, moreover, the appli-
cant has sworn a current intent to bring a product forward in the near future, which is 
very different from the likelihood of needing health care later in life. 
135 See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–33 (engaging in extended threshold analysis to properly 
define “class of activities” being regulated in regard to the drug market); Wickard, 317 
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the “legitimate end” of trademark regulation generally?  Not until we 
determine this can we ask whether local instances of trademark 
propertization are reasonably adapted to meet this end. 
As has been discussed extensively above in a few contexts, that le-
gitimate end is the regulation of the sale and rendering of goods and 
services flowing in commerce, and the protection of brand-owners 
who invest in maintaining a reputation for those products.136  Critical-
ly, the legitimate end is not the creation and protection of trademark 
signifiers for their own sake.  Nor can it be for a few reasons. 
First, the creation of a property right in trademark signifiers can-
not itself be the legitimate end because Congress can only regulate 
preexisting commerce under the Commerce Clause, not create new 
commerce.137  Chief Justice John Roberts, as well as the joint dissent-
ers, make this very point in their various analyses in Sebelius.138  In 
Chief Justice Roberts’ words, “[t]he power to regulate commerce pre-
supposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”139  Just 
as Congress could not use its Commerce Clause authority to create 
the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate because that would vest 
 
U.S. at 128–29 (determining that regulation of price of wheat in interstate market was le-
gitimate end).  Accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2592–93 (explaining that Congress was acting 
within its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause although the regulation at 
hand involved some “purely intrastate activity”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 
(1971) (noting that the appropriate “measure” is the “class of activities regulated”); San 
Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Con-
gress has the power to regulated purely intrastate activity as long as the activity is being 
regualated under a general regulatory scheme that bears a substantial relationship to in-
terstate commerce.”); United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he class of activity is the relevant unit of analysis.”). 
136 See generally supra Part IV(A)(ii).  Congress has analogously given the Federal Trade 
Commission authority to regulate, under the Commerce Clause, “unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  This is generally 
understood to include “the responsibility to protect the consumer from being misled by 
governing the conditions under which goods and services are advertised and sold to indi-
vidual purchasers.”  Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 685 (D.C. Cir. 
1973).  As such, the constitutional analysis effectively parallels the Lanham Act in its tight 
link to the effect on actual goods and services in interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1964) (summarizing evidence of 
sales of tires, batteries, and automobile accessories to support the holding that these activ-
ities substantially affected commerce). 
137 A majority of five Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, writing the opinion, and the four dis-
senting Justices) clearly reached this conclusion.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (“If the 
power to ‘regulate’ something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in 
the Constitution would be superfluous.”).  See also id. at 2644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that to “regulate” something “can mean to direct the manner of something but not to 
direct that something come into being”). 
138 Id. at 2594 (discussing Congress’s constitutional authority to tax with respect to the Af-
fordable Care Act). 
139 Id. at 2572. 
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it with “the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to 
the exercise of an enumerated power,”140 Congress may not 
propertize trademark signifiers as the necessary predicate to regulat-
ing them.141 
This analysis ties directly back to Felix Cohen’s early critique of 
trademark propertization as an entirely circular phenomenon.142  As 
Cohen observed, it is nonsensical to say that we should protect 
trademarks because they are valuable. 143  Rather, in calling a trade-
mark property, we give it value.  In just the same way, were Congress 
to pass a trademark statute granting property rights to trademark sig-
nifiers as such, the statute would itself be creating the property inter-
est and the mark’s value.  In no way would Congress be protecting a 
preexisting thing of value or property interest.144 
Second, trademark signifiers, standing alone, are non-economic 
things.  They are symbols or signs associated mentally with their signi-
fied meanings.  In other words, they are just language.  Only in their 
connection to referent goods or services do they take on economic 
importance, in the sense of being involved the “production, distribu-
 
140 Id. at 2573. 
141 Professor Port anticipated this language in Sebelius when he noted in regards to dilution: 
[T]he regulation of trademarks in the abstract is what gives them commercial val-
ue in the first place. But for the FTDA, trademarks would not have value in the ab-
stract as used on products unrelated to the goods or services specified in the 
trademark application. It seems quite circular to argue that Congress’ regulation 
has given something commercial value; because it has commercial value it is now 
inherently commercial”; and, therefore, Congress can regulate it. This seems to be 
the logic that flows from the notion of federal protection of trademarks from dilu-
tion. 
  Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 905. 
142 See Cohen, supra note 6, at 814 (“Modern developments in the law of unfair competition 
offer many examples of such circular reasoning.”). 
143 Id. at 815. 
144 One escape from this circle in the federalism context could be that one or more states 
create the property interest, and Congress regulates activities affecting that interest as 
“substantially affecting commerce.”  In other words, if one or more states adopt a 
propertized trademark regime (for example, passing laws such that, in those states, one 
who creates a trademark is its owner), then it would be the state regime, not Congress, 
which created the value.  Congress would merely be recognizing the state-created inter-
ests and protecting against activities, including local ones, that affect the interest’s value.  
One immediate difficulty emerges, though, regarding this potential justification for fed-
eral protection of trademark propertization.  Namely, the common law of trademarks 
consistently requires use with goods or services to attain state trademark rights.  See gener-
ally Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 18 (1995) (“A designation is ‘used’ as a 
trademark . . . when the designation is displayed or otherwise made known to prospective 
purchasers in the ordinary course of business in a manner that associates the designation 
with the goods, services, or business of the user  . . . .”).  The author is indebted to Tigran 
W. Eldred for this insight. 
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tion, and consumption of commodities.”145  Under Lopez, Morrison, 
and even Raich, the end goal of an affecting commerce analysis itself 
should still relate to an “economic enterprise” (consistent with the 
commercial nature of the “Commerce” Clause) even if the chosen 
means need not be in each instance.146 
If, then, Congress is able regulate trademark signifiers due to their 
effect on interstate commerce, it must be as a rational means to regu-
late referent goods and services in commerce.147  How reasonable, 
then, is it for Congress to grant exclusive use of certain words and 
symbols, divorced from any referent goods and services, in order to 
regulate goods and services?  Put in Lopez terms, what chain of infer-
ences must we be willing to allow Congress to make in order to 
propertize trademarks in the name of regulating goods and ser-
vices?148 
Tracking the logic used in the category one and two analyses 
above, Congress can justify granting exclusive rights in trademark 
 
145 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dic-
tionary (1966)).  Port is more cautious about this conclusion and is willing to “concede 
that regulation of trademarks may be inherently commercial, even in the abstract.”  Port, 
Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 905.  But viewed through the semiotic lens, there 
appears to be nothing inherently commercial about symbols unless and until they are 
used with goods and services.  In other words, it is not the inherent nature of trademark 
signifiers that makes them commercial, but rather their logically subsequent (and ines-
sential) association to goods and services that makes them so. 
146 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (noting that the activities regulated by the Controlled Sub-
stances Act are “quintessentially economic”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 
(2000) (reaffirming that the Court will uphold congressional acts regulating economic 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 559–561 (1995) (holding that where economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation that seeks to regulate that activity will be sustained).  But c.f., 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111 (1942) on the basis that the failure to act, like “the failure to grow wheat,” is “not 
an economic activity”). 
147 In this regard, we need to pay close attention to the type of goods and services with which 
Congress may be seeking to regulate trademark signifiers.  This is because the Lanham 
Act allows for regulating marks used in connection with both commercial and non-
commercial activities.  United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 
F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997).  Although the relevance of the distinction for Commerce 
Clause purposes between commercial and non-conmmercial activities remains hotly de-
bated, it is generally agreed that Lopez and Morrison made federal regulation of the latter 
more constitutionally suspect, at least to some degree.  See DENNING, supra note 43, at 5–
41 (analyzing arguments as to whether “the Lopez distinctions between economic and 
non-economic (or commercial and non-commercial) activities is a harbinger of judicial 
revisionism to come”). 
148 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have 
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States.”). 
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signifiers, even as to non-confusing goods and services, in order to in-
centivize brand owners to first create and use strong brands with par-
ticular goods and services in commerce.  Congress may reasonably 
conclude that promising such a long-term reward in the form of a di-
lution right is a way to encourage the conveyance of clear infor-
mation about goods and services early on.149  It may, in other words, 
rationally choose a scheme that allows trademark owners to protect 
their brands divorced from specific goods and services after sufficient 
use with those goods and services, like a space shuttle ejecting its 
booster rockets once it clears the atmosphere. 
Congress may not, however, grant dilution-type protection imme-
diately upon creation of a new logo that has not been used, and is not 
yet intended to be used, with any particular goods and services.  This 
would require the inference that the logo will be used to help convey 
information about goods and services in commerce, but there is no 
logical basis for such an inference.  There is by definition no connec-
tion here to any goods and services.  This is true even if the marks 
achieve immense fame and distinction as marks, and are unlike any 
other marks that ever came before them.  Unless at some point the 
chain links the mark to specific goods and services in commerce, 
then the means is completely non-adapted to attaining the ends and 
therefore lacking constitutional authorization.  Nor, for the same rea-
son, may Congress constitutionally grant property rights in 
standalone trademark signifiers as such. 
If this result should seem similar to the conclusions reached un-
der categories one and two, then that should not be surprising.  The 
key point across each analysis is that goods and services are in com-
merce, not trademarks.  Congress may regulate the latter to control 
the former.  But, no authority exists under the Commerce Clause for 
Congress to authorize the creation or protection of the latter for its 
own sake. 
B. The Commerce Clause and Collective Action Federalism 
Apart from traditional Commerce Clause analysis, it is also useful 
to view the question through the lens of newer theoretical models 
 
149 Professor Port cautiously reaches a different conclusion with respect to dilution and other 
propertizing amendments to the Lanham Act, arguing, “[l]ike in Lopez, the Lanham Act’s 
essential purpose will not fail without ITU, FTDA, or ACPA.”  Port, Congressional Expan-
sion, supra note 2, at 906.  This, however, appears to ask whether the FTDA is necessary to 
achieve the Lanham Act’s purpose, which is not the current test under Raich.  Rather, the 
test is simply whether it is “rational” means (or “reasonably adapted,” as Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence states) to achieve the chosen ends.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, 37. 
Apr. 2015] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON TRADEMARK 1103 
 
that have been developed to explain the scope of congressional au-
thority under the clause.  In particular, Robert D. Cooter and Neil S. 
Siegel argue that the Commerce Clause, consistent with the general 
structure of the enumerated powers, is best understood to apply to 
solve “a problem of collective action involving at least two states.”150  
This approach encourages us to ask whether the subject area of regu-
lation poses a collective action problem created by “interstate exter-
nalities and national markets.”151  If it does not, then a more convinc-
ing case can be made that the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
its regulation by Congress. 
To understand what is meant by this theoretical approach to 
Commerce Clause analysis, the authors explain their “internalization 
principle” of U.S. federalism, which tells us to “assign power to the 
smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its exer-
cise.”152  This economically-minded principle balances two ever-
present tensions in the federal system:  the incentive for states to free 
ride on other states in the absence of federal power, and the converse 
majoritarian risk that a national Congress will exploit states in the 
minority.153 
Thus “the key inquiry” as to whether commerce is interstate, and 
therefore within the scope of Congress’s commerce power, is whether 
there is a collective action problem between at least two states.154  For 
instance, in criminal cases we might ask “how much coordination 
among law enforcement personnel in different states is required to 
police the proscribed conduct at issue.”155  The particular conclusion 
in Lopez could be explained by the fact that 
enforcing a prohibition on guns within school zones seems the opposite 
of a problem requiring coordination among law enforcement officers in 
different states.  It seems local:  local officials presumably have better in-
formation concerning who might carry firearms near schools, and better 
incentives to do something about the problem.156 
 
150 Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:  A General Theory of Article I, 
Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 164–65 (2010). 
151 Id. at 116. 
152 Id. at 144. 
153 See id. (“[B]enefits and costs that spill across state lines create an incentive for each state 
to free ride on efforts of other states . . . . Empowering Congress animates collective ac-
tion, but risks exploiting states in the minority.”). 
154 Id. at 165. 
155 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 150, at 163. 
156 Id. at 164. 
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There is arguably no collective action problem in keeping schools 
gun free (though there might be one in suppressing the national 
market for guns). 
Of particular interest here, the authors observe their internaliza-
tion principle running throughout all of the enumerated power of 
Article 1, Clause 8, including Section 8, which they characterize as au-
thorizing Congress “to make intellectual property.”157  The authors 
suggest that the decision to give the federal government this power 
may be justified by the internalization principle: 
Effective intellectual property law enables creators to collect fees from 
users of their creations, which provides an incentive for creativity.  Be-
cause the problem of unauthorized use extends across state lines, the 
problem is national and Congress is better placed than the states to solve 
it.  Federal intellectual property laws enable creators to collect fees from 
users across the nation, which creates a unified national market for crea-
tive works.158 
For our purposes, then, we might ask whether trademark 
propertization poses a collective action problem.  In seeking to regu-
late trademark signifiers divorced from goods or services, is Congress 
faced with something akin to the problem of unauthorized use of pa-
tents or copyrights, where states would be hard-pressed to coordinate 
efficiently with one another without free-riding and creating external-
ities that impact the incentives for creation (such as if one state be-
came an IP-piracy haven)?  Or are problems such as dilution more 
like local crimes that states can remedy (or not) within their own 
borders without the need for much coordination? 
Put more concretely, is there necessarily an interstate externality 
created if the Louis Vuitton toile monogram is made weaker, in the 
abstract, in some states than others?  The answer is far from obvious.  
On the one hand, it is a nationally-known symbol, and we might wor-
ry that one state’s weak trademark propertization regime might risk 
diluting the brand for all purposes in all places.  Trademark signs 
cannot be contained within one state’s jurisdiction; they travel wher-
ever they are known in the public’s mind, so we cannot simply tell the 
trademark owner to enter only those states it prefers.  Moreover, it 
would be far more difficult for all states to come together to agree on 
 
157 Id. at 148–49.  This is, more precisely the Patent and Copyright Clause, not a clause cover-
ing trademark law, which is an important clarification for these purposes. 
158 Id. 
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a dilution law—without encouraging race-to-the-bottom type behav-
iors159—than for Congress to simply step in and create one. 
On the other hand, for centuries trademark law generally has fol-
lowed geographical lines.  Just as we should not be concerned if a 
mark-owner’s rights are senior in Massachusetts but junior elsewhere, 
there is no reason to presume that we have a problem just because an 
abstract symbol might be more distinctive in Massachusetts than in 
Alabama.  This latter view, moreover, is consistent with the original 
thoughts of the Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases, which resist-
ed the notion that trademarks could be justified as creative goods like 
patents and copyrights that we need to encourage through a national 
system of protection.160  Even schemes as quintessentially national 
under the collective-action theory as the patent and copyright sys-
tems, for that matter, still look to state law for underlying property-
type questions such as ownership and transfer.161 
In the end, the collective action question is a deeply empirical one 
that is outside the scope of this Article to answer satisfactorily.  As 
Cooter and Siegel caution, “Finding the scope of interstate externali-
ties and market failures requires mathematical theory, econometrics, 
cost-benefit analysis, psychological surveys, behavioral experiments, 
etc.”162  What is critical, however, is that the collective action question 
must be addressed to the protection of trademark signifiers as such, 
and not trademark regulation generally. 
C. Alternative Justifications for Federal Authority to Regulate Trademark 
Signifiers 
Before concluding any review of Congress’s authority to 
propertize trademarks, two alternative constitutional sources need to 
be considered:  the Patent and Copyright Clause163 and the Treaty-
Implementing Power.164 
 
159 See White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (describing an analogous issue under copyright law in the pub-
licity context). 
160 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
161 State law, for instance, generally “governs contractual obligations and transfers of proper-
ty rights to patents.”  Krauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 
2012) (citations omitted).  The same is generally true of copyrights as well.  See, e.g., Keith 
v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that an action to establish title 
does not arise under the federal Copyright Act and should be brought in state court). 
162 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 150, at 154–55. 
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
164 The treaty-implementing power, as elucidated in Missouri v. Holland, is not expressly con-
tained in the text of the Constitution.  252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (“If the treaty is valid 
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i. Patent and Copyright Clause 
As discussed above in Part III.B, the Patent and Copyright Clause 
was first advanced almost 135 years ago as the source for Congress’s 
authority to pass the original federal trademark statute.165  The Su-
preme Court, however, rejected that argument, because trademarks 
are not novel or original products of the brain that are invented or 
discovered like the subjects of patent and copyright law.  Rather, 
trademark rights are acquired through simple priority of use with 
goods and services.166 
The Court based its analysis, however, on the premise that the 
trademark statute under consideration did not create trademark 
property rights in the first instance, as such rights were created by the 
common law. 
This exclusive right was not created by the act of Congress, and does not 
now depend upon it for its enforcement.  The whole system of trade-
mark property and the civil remedies for its protection existed long ante-
rior to that act, and have remained in full force since its passage.167 
The trademark statute was understood merely to provide a mecha-
nism for registering and enforcing this common law property right. 
The trademark propertization critique, however, largely flips this 
premise on its head.  It is now Congress that seeks to recognize 
trademark property rights in the first instance.  While this makes it 
harder to justify Commerce Clause authorization, it potentially brings 
Congress closer to the subject matter of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.  The essence of the propertization model is that Congress is 
making trademarks more like copyrights and patents. 
Problems, however, remain with using the Patent and Copyright 
Clause as a fount for congressional authority.  First, trademark rights 
are not issued for “limited times,” as required by the text of the 
clause, but may be maintained and renewed indefinitely so long as in 
use.168 
The Patent and Copyright Clause, moreover, is at least arguably 
premised on a quid pro quo model.169  The government grants a lim-
 
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary 
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”). 
165 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94. 
166 Id. at 94. 
167 Id. at 92. 
168 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–204 (2003) (describing the “limited Times” re-
quirement for copyrights and early patents). 
169 Id. at 214 (demurring to petitioners’ description of the Copyright Clause as a grant of 
legislative authority empowering Congress “to secure a bargain—this for that”). 
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ited-time right in return for contributing to the public a new inven-
tion or work of authorship.  But, as the Supreme Court observed, 
trademarks do not require novelty or originality.170  Society is assured 
no new product of the mind by the grant of a trademark right.  We 
would therefore need to import both a novelty or originality re-
quirement, and a time limit, into trademark law before the Patent 
and Copyright Clause could be the source of congressional authority 
for trademark propertization. 
ii. Treaty-Implementing Authority 
The Supreme Court expressly avoided, in the Trade-Mark Cases, 
addressing the question of whether a general federal trademark stat-
ute might be supported under Congress’s right to pass laws necessary 
to carry treaties into effect.171  The question of whether Congress can 
pass such laws, even if those laws would otherwise be beyond Con-
gress’s enumerated powers, is the subject of intense academic debate 
and outside the scope of this article.172  It should be noted, though, 
that there is some evidence that Congress relied upon its treaty-
implementing power in passing at least some early trademark legisla-
tion.173 
Even assuming that Congress possesses such a power, we would 
need to locate a treaty necessitating that the United States propertize 
trademark rights for it to apply in this context.  Although many for-
eign jurisdictions use property-based trademark regimes,174 most 
trademark treaties to which the United States is a party (such as the 
Paris Convention) merely require the United States to grant foreign 
nationals the same protections that it makes available to U.S. citi-
 
170 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
171 Id. at 99. 
172 See generally Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 59 (2014) (using an analysis of historical practice to contribute to the cur-
rent debate over whether Congress can pass legislation beyond its enumerated powers in 
order to implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
173 Specifically, as explored by Jean Galbraith, the treaty-implementing power was probably 
the source relied upon by Congress when it passed its first revised piece of trademark leg-
islation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Trade-Mark Cases.  Id. at 97–
102. 
174 See, e.g., Council Regulation 207/2009 art. 11, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 2 (EC) (“A Community 
trade mark is to be regarded as an object of property which exists separately from the un-
dertakings whose goods or services are designated by it.”).  See also, Port, Congressional Ex-
pansion, supra note 2, at 831–34 (analyzing civil law jurisdictions where trademarks are 
treated as subject to property ownership). 
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zens.175  Others, like the Madrid Protocol, are merely administrative 
vehicles for aiding the acquisition and maintenance of registrations 
in countries outside of the applicant’s country of origin.176 
There are admittedly some baseline substantive requirements in 
various treaties to which the United States is a party, but none of 
them can credibly be read to require Congress to grant rights to 
trademark signifiers apart from any goods and services.177  The Paris 
Convention requirement to prevent some forms of unfair competi-
tion, for instance, is inextricably tied to goods and commercial activi-
ties.178  Perhaps the Well-Known Marks requirement in that same con-
vention under provision 6bis (requiring, in essence, that marks 
famous in another country but not yet used in the subject country be 
protected) comes closest.179  But that only applies to non-U.S. marks 
(and therefore cannot justify signifier protection for U.S.-based 
marks), and in any event courts have ruled that the United States 
“has not yet incorporated that doctrine into federal trademark law.”180 
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON TRADEMARK 
PROPERTIZATION 
As explicated at length above, a thorough review of the arguments 
supporting Congress’s authority to propertize trademarks reveals that 
there is a fundamental, constitutional limitation on trademark 
propertization.  Namely, Congress may not recognize or protect a 
 
175 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 29:25–26 (noting that the convention only re-
quires the United States to give protection to foreign marks equal to the protection af-
forded domestic ones). 
176 Id. § 29:32. 
177 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which the United States. signed in 2011, does 
contain some baseline requirements for IP enforcement that could be interpreted as pro-
tecting trademark signifiers.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, ACTA FACT SHEET AND GUIDE TO PUBLIC DRAFT TEXT (2010), available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2010/acta-fact-sheet-and-guide-
public-draft-text (describing “a requirement for criminal remedies for use or importation 
of labels for packaging of counterfeit goods”).  It is not, however,  a treaty but rather a 
trade agreement entered into by the United States Trade Representative under the au-
thority of the President, without the consent of Congress.  MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 
29:33.50 (citing Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem:  The Treaty is Not a Treaty, 26 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 903, 926 (2011)). 
178 See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 29:25 (citing United International Bureaux for the Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Proper-
ty art. 10bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]). 
179 Paris Convention, supra note 178, art. 6bis. 
180 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007); see generally Blake W. Jack-
son, Note, Notorious:  The Treatment of Famous Trademarks in America and How Protection Can 
Be Ensured, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L., 61, 65–77 (2009) (explicating the same). 
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property interest in trademark signifiers except as a rational means to 
furthering the regulation of referent goods or services.  This princi-
ple should be used as both a limitation on the drafting of federal 
trademark laws, as well as a practical guideline for limiting construc-
tion of such legislation. 
This limitation, it must be underscored, is critically distinct from 
the statutory “use in commerce” requirement built into the Lanham 
Act.181  The latter is simply one means to avoid the constitutional 
problem by requiring a trademark owner to use the mark in connec-
tion with goods and services in commerce to attain a registration, or 
unregistered rights under Section 43(a).  The constitutional limita-
tion articulated here, by contrast, is in one sense broader and more 
permissive in that it allows Congress to adapt any rational means to 
regulate such goods and services (including, for instance, an incen-
tive system that only requires the trademark be used with goods and 
services for a limited time).  But at the same time, the limitation is 
more fundamental and potentially more meaningful in that unlike 
the particular statutory use in commerce requirement in the Lanham 
Act, Congress can never avoid this ultimate constitutional ceiling.  It 
is a bar for all time, with the one exception of constitutional amend-
ment.182  A number of examples of the operation of this constitutional 
limitation follow below. 
A. Examples of the Constitutional Limitation in Operation 
Starting with an extreme case, at its outset this article hypothe-
sized a statute, based on Professor Stephen L. Carter’s conception of 
trademark propertization, as commencing not with use of (or inten-
tion to use) a trademark with goods and services, but rather with au-
thorship of a trademark: 
Trademark protection subsists in trademarks fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression.  Trademarks protected under this 
title vest initially in the author or authors of the marks. 
 
181 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
182 As detailed by Zvi Rosen, constitutional amendments designed to clarify and broaden 
Congress’s power over trademark regulation were introduced and referred to committee 
on eight different occasions between 1879 and 1955.  See Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the 
Trade-mark Cases:  The Nascent Treaty Power and the Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark 
Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 875–901 (2009) (charting history of attempted constitu-
tional amendments).  Rosen generally attributes the historic failure of, and current lack 
of interest in, such an amendment to the expansion of the Commerce Clause power, 
which grew to cover enough commerce so as to render an amendment unnecessary.  Id. 
at 901. 
1110 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
Could, then, Congress pass this new federal trademark law?  Under 
the constitutional limitation on trademark propertization, it could 
not do so.  Such a statute would be unconstitutional on its face, lack-
ing any connection to referent goods or services. 
What, then, if Congress sought to pass the same statute with a ju-
risdictional hook that seeks to avoid an explicit connection to goods 
and services?  For instance, imagine a federal law saying: 
Trademark protection subsists in trademarks in commerce 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.  Trademarks pro-
tected under this title vest initially in the author or authors of 
the marks.  The word “commerce” means all commerce which 
may lawfully be regulated by Congress. 
This new statute would be unconstitutional on its face unless it was 
saved by reading the “in commerce” limitation to bring in goods and 
services through the back door.  If “in commerce” as used here is not 
tied to referent goods or services, then the attempted jurisdictional 
hook fails because it would be effectively meaningless.  As discussed at 
length above, trademark signifiers as such are simply not commerce. 
183 
What about the current dilution statute, Section 1125(c)?  Are 
there any constitutional concerns lurking there?  As currently draft-
ed, the statute likely avoids a facial constitutional problem, but only 
because of the definition of fame.  In particular, only “famous” marks 
are protected from dilution, and a mark is only famous if “widely rec-
ognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”184 
What, though, if Congress tweaks the statute to broaden the defi-
nition of fame to cover any mark “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States” so as to make fame less de-
pendent on use with specific goods and services?  This would be un-
constitutional.  This seeks to protect trademark signifiers merely for 
being well known, not for being well known with specific goods and 
services.  It is thus not a rational means to encourage use of strong 
brands with goods or services to convey product information to the 
public, but rather to encourage strong brands as such.  Nor can we 
save the statute by pointing to the fact that we are asking whether the 
general “consuming” public recognizes the mark, as opposed to the 
general public.  That is just a limitation on who is doing the recogniz-
ing, as opposed to what they recognize (i.e., whether that recognized 
thing is “in commerce”). 
 
183 See supra Part V.A. 
184 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2012). 
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The constitutional limitation on trademark propertization also 
has potentially powerful application to the arena of assignments in 
gross.  The Lanham Act limits the ability of trademark owners to as-
sign their registrations and marks as follows: 
A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been 
filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the 
mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected 
with the use of and symbolized by the mark.185 
While this does require that a mark’s goodwill (signified) be sold with 
the signifier, it specifically omits any requirement that the referent 
goods or services (“business”) be included in an assignment.  Indeed, 
such a further limitation only appears in the context of intent-to-use 
applications, which require that the applicant assign not just the 
goodwill in its business but actually “the business of the applicant, or 
portion thereof, to which the mark pertains.” 186 
This raises serious constitutional concerns.  If Congress’s legiti-
mate end in regulating trademarks must be the control of goods and 
services, how can it justify a regime that allows for the sale of a trade-
mark’s signifier divorced from the actual goods or services with which 
it was used?  How can this be a rational means to control goods and 
services?  To the contrary, in sanctioning sales divorced from refer-
ents, Congress cedes all such control. 
In support of this provision’s constitutionality one could argue 
that Congress might rationally determine that too few people would 
invest in developing strong trademarks for use with goods and ser-
vices if they cannot sell those marks once successful.  That is true 
enough.  To take the further step, however, and argue that too few 
people would invest in developing strong trademarks for use with 
goods and services unless they could sell those marks separate and 
apart from that portion of their business is a different, and far weaker, 
proposition.  The italicized language adds little to the businessper-
son’s incentives to develop a trademark.  Yet the underlined language 
captures the essential feature  of an assignment in gross.  In short, 
Congress cannot justify a trademark regime permitting assignments 
in gross on the basis of the importance of permitting assignments 
generally, because that relies on too attenuated a chain of inferences 
under Lopez and related cases.187 
The constitutional limitation might also apply to priority contests, 
including especially priority contests where one party claims priority 
 
185 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012). 
186 Id. 
187 See supra Part V. 
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of use through pre-sale activities.188  No court may read the Lanham 
Act to give priority before the occurrence of either:  (1) actual deliv-
ery of a good or rendering of a service in, or affecting, commerce or 
(2) evidence that such delivery or rendering is forthcoming.189  Put 
another way, under the Lanham Act, mere advertising of a trade-
mark’s signifier must be insufficient to support use of a trademark for 
constitutional (and not merely statutory) reasons.190 
For similar reasons, United States Shoe191 and related “pure advertis-
ing” cases discussed in Part III(B), supra, are wrongly decided and 
should be reversed.  Unless the parties can show that the subject ser-
vice affected interstate commerce, or somehow connect (even cir-
cumstantially) interstate advertising to customers arriving from those 
states (neither of which were shown in United States Shoe), reliance on 
national advertising, by itself, cannot constitutionally justify the grant 
of federal trademark rights. 
Finally, what about the Hyundai ad from the Louis Vuitton case 
discussed above?192  This remains a very tough case.  It involves a 
clearly famous mark owned by a plaintiff that the plaintiff long used 
with specific goods and services in commerce.  Defendant (who 
placed an imitation of the logo on a basketball) arguably did not use 
the signifier in commerce.  Can the court constitutionally apply the 
dilution statute to that defendant’s conduct while denying, as it did, 
the materiality of whether Hyundai ever used the mark in connection 
with its own goods and services?193 
The answer turns on whether Congress may reasonably decide to 
snuff out any and all use by a defendant in order to regulate goods 
and services of the plaintiff.  Critically, this is an additional step re-
 
188 See, e.g., New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(observing that pre-sale activities involving mark may establish trademark priority where 
the mark was still used “in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked 
goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind”). 
189 See, e.g., id. (holding that circulation of 430,000 of exemplar covers of new magazine, ac-
ceptance of subscriptions and other activity, establishes use of mark even though maga-
zine itself was not yet published).  See also Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 
F.3d 1188, 1196–98 (11th Cir. 2001) (establishing priority through presale activities relat-
ing to referent software product with which mark was to be used). 
190 Cf. New West Corp., 595 F.2d at 1200 (holding that mere advertising is insufficient, under 
the Lanham Act, for use priority).  This analysis only applies to priority decisions that a 
federal court justifies by reference to federal law (i.e., the Lanham Act).  The Commerce 
Clause poses no bar to a federal court looking to state law for a substantive rule of priori-
ty. 
191 United States Shoe Corp. v. J. Riggs West, Inc. 221 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1022 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
192 Supra Part II. 
193 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611, 2012 WL 1022247, 
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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moved from saying that the use by the defendant affects the trade-
mark signifier of the plaintiff.  It must connect back to plaintiff’s 
goods and services.  As previously discussed, there is certainly an ar-
gument that Congress is entitled to reward brand-owners with such 
expansive rights in order to encourage clearly labeled goods and ser-
vices somewhere down the inference chain.  However, that is just an 
argument, and depending on how strictly we read cases like Morrison 
or Lopez, it might take the form of an impermissible inference built 
upon an inference.  This is particularly true if one considers use of a 
trademark’s signifier, disassociated from any goods and services, to be 
a fundamentally non-economic activity. 
B. In Support of Trademark Localism 
It is largely outside the scope of this Article to explore in any 
depth the relative merits, from a policy and federalism perspective, of 
state or even local control of substantive trademark law, as compared 
to federal control.  A few points may help frame what would surely be 
a fruitful area for further inquiry. 
First, one needs to clarify the nature of the inquiry.  The central 
question should not, for this purpose, be whether propertization is a 
good or bad thing.  Rather, as articulated by Cooter and Siegel,194 the 
more important question from a constitutional perspective is what 
decision making body is in the best position to answer the 
propertization question?  That decision must be informed by the 
practical realities of a national economy, and questions of externali-
ties and majoritarian exploitation of minorities. 195 
Second, anybody wading into these waters must acknowledge at 
the outset that pushing control of any part of trademark law down to 
the state or even municipal level will initially strike most trademark 
practitioners and brand-owners as being an irrational lark at best, or 
more likely a mad rush off a cliff.  No one in their right mind, the 
claim might go, would advocate for a patchwork quilt of state trade-
 
194 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 150, at 116. 
195 Professor Port tends toward the former approach.  While he convincingly argues that 
propertization is a bad thing, and contrary to historical trademark practice in the United 
States, he generally avoids explaining why decentralization is a proper response to the is-
sue.  Constitutional federalism is, after all, about who should be shaping the law, not 
about what shape it should take.  The closest Professor Port comes to justifying decentral-
ized control over trademark regulation in Congressional Expansion is to argue that dilution 
law “had been a traditional area of state regulation.”  Port, Congressional Expansion, supra 
note 2, at 906.  But this does not tell us who should be doing the regulating, or why they 
should be doing it, in the prescriptive sense. 
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mark regulation over a national rule in anything trademark related.  
Imagine analyzing a simple clearance search for one mark, which 
would require not just a search of each state registry, but an applica-
tion of each unique state law to the results.196  A national brand-
owner, like a long-distance trucker charting a course through states 
with different trucking regulations, would either need to rebrand at 
problem state boundaries or avoid them entirely.  One could only 
imagine the looks one would get if one were to float, at an Interna-
tional Trademark Association annual meeting, the idea of giving 
more trademark control to the states.  Trademark practitioners and 
brand owners would think the idea preposterous on its face.  No 
cocktail party invitation will be forthcoming for the lonely proponent.  
How, then, could decentralized trademark control possibly be justi-
fied in the global information age? 
One tempting response to this challenge emphasizes the historical 
fact that trademark regulation was until the twentieth century a crea-
ture of state common law control.  The federalization project has 
long been in tension with the strong state-based underpinnings of 
U.S. trademark law.197  As Professor Port emphasizes, dilution for in-
stance was exclusively a state law creature until the mid-1990s.198 
Though accurate, this answer remains susceptible to the retort 
that our twenty-first century digital economy is far more nationalized 
(indeed, globalized) now than it was in the nineteenth century, or 
even the 1940s when the Lanham Act was passed.  Why shouldn’t 
trademark law adapt to the times, and itself become more national?  
Few if any brand-owners see state lines as relevant to the reach of 
their products or services.  So why should the trademark law continue 
to give state boundaries such importance, even if that made sense be-
fore?  Congress, assuming no constitutional barrier, is free to alter 
statutorily the underlying source of trademark rights to accommodate 
the changing times. 
A more satisfying answer avoids this counterargument.  As sug-
gested throughout this Article, this alternate answer focuses on the 
 
196 This was basically the state of U.S. dilution law prior to the creation of a federal action for 
dilution.  See Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 876–77 (noting that, prior to 
passage of the federal dilution law, twenty-five states had adopted dilution statutes, and 
three states included dilution as part of their common law). 
197 See generally MARK P. MCKENNA, TRADEMARK LAW’S FAUX FEDERALISM, IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed. (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) (arguing that state law has not played a significant substantive role in the his-
tory of trademark and unfair competition, except in some cases in the modern era to 
broaden the scope of rights beyond the Landham Act). 
198 Port, Congressional Expansion, supra note 2, at 906. 
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conceptual importance of separating trademark regulation generally 
from trademark propertization.  When viewed separate and apart 
from goods and services flowing in or affecting commerce, the need 
for national regulation of a trademark’s signifier becomes far less self-
evident.  What we are really talking about here, after all, is control 
over the signified meaning and strength of logos and words, their 
signification and value.  We are not asking to what physical products a 
swoosh may be affixed, but rather what we think of (or don’t think 
of) when we think of a swoosh, and how immediately and clearly we 
come to think of that. 
Viewed from that perspective (i.e., trademark propertization as 
control over raw symbol strength and meaning) it is difficult to con-
ceive of anything more personal, intimate, and local.  This is, in es-
sence, language.  If anything cries out for some level of community 
control, it is the pure communicative function to us and those 
around us of the symbols we see when we take a walk, ride the sub-
way, or open the refrigerator.  The regulation of goods and services 
that these symbols refer to may certainly be something of national 
concern.  But the amount of abstract differential distinctiveness that 
we wish to grant each such symbol over all other symbols, and the 
right to control the meaning of that symbol, separate from goods and 
services actually in the world, remains a question best answered dif-
ferently in every community. 
This is not to say, of course, that Nike should not have any control 
over the abstract meaning and distinctiveness of a swoosh.  Rather, 
the degree we wish to cede such control to Nike should be a local de-
cision because local groups are better situated to make that funda-
mentally social-linguistic determination than the government of the 
United States.  The more we federalize trademark propertization, the 
more we federalize language, culture, and who we are as people. 
In all, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
goods and services crossing state borders, or affecting commerce that 
does, is broad to the point of being plenary.  In connection with this 
power, Congress certainly may regulate the symbols used to make 
those goods and services, and their qualities, memorable in the pub-
lic’s mind.  Congress may not, however, leverage its authority to regu-
late referent goods and services into a plenary authority to regulate 
trademark signifiers as such.  Its right to regulate trademark signifi-
ers, especially its right to create exclusive property interests in them, 
must always remain rooted in the regulation of goods and services.  
The further it drifts from that end, the more skeptical we must be to-
wards using trademark propertization as a means.  Otherwise, we risk 
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federalizing the pure use of words and logos as words and logos, or, 
put another way, basic language. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
